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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 940762-CA 
V, : 
KIMBERLEE H. WINWARD : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for unlawful dealing 
with property by a fiduciary, a second degree felony, in 
violat ion of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-513 (Supp. 1993), in the Fifth 
Judicial District Court -in and for Iron County, the Honorable 
Lyle R. Anderson, Judge Pro Tern, presiding.1 This Court has 
jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3 (2) (f) (Supp. 1994). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Does Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-513 (1990), providing for 
unlawful dealing with property by a fiduciary, require that the 
fiduciary have complete control or possession of property before 
felony sanctions. The review court independently reviews 
questions of statutory construction for correctness. State v. 
Galleaos, 849 P.2d 586, 589 (Utah App. 1993); State v. Souza, 846 
1
 Judge Anderson, of the Seventh Judicial District Court, 
was evidently assigned to preside over this case by the Honorable 
David L. Mower, following the disqualification of the original 
trial court judge, the Honorable James L. Shumate (R. 228-29). 
P.2d 1313, 1317 (Utah App. 1993). 
2. Was defendant entitled to a special verdict on the 
precise manner in which she violated her fiduciary duty, where 
the precise manner of the violation is not an element of the 
offense? An appeal challenging the refusal to give jury 
instructions presents a question of law. The trial court's legal 
conclusion is not accorded any particular deference and is 
reviewed for its correctness. State v. Singh, 819 P.2 356, 360 
Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 832 P.2d 476 (Utah 1992). 
3. Did the trial court exercise appropriate discretion in 
denying defendant's request for an evidentiary hearing on her 
motion to disqualify the prosecutor and in denying the motion? 
Review of the trial court's denial of an evidentiary hearing and 
denial of a motion to disqualify is had for abuse of discretion. 
United States v. Gines, 964 F.2d 972, 977 (10th Cir. 1992), cert, 
denied, 113 S. Ct. 1023 (1993); United States v. Peterman, 841 
F.2d 1474, 1484 (10th Cir. 1988), cert, denied, 488 U.S. 1004 
(1989); State v. Gray, 851 P.2d 1217, 1227 (Utah App.), cert, 
denied, 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The following constitutional provisions, statutes and rules, 
whose interpretation is determinative of the issues on appeal, 
are cited below and reproduced in full in Addendum A.-
Utah Code Ann. 76-1-104 (1995); 
Utah Code Ann. 76-1-106 (1995); 
Utah Code Ann. 76-6-401 (1995); 
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Utah Code Ann. 76-6-513 (1990) . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Kimberlee H. Winward, was charged by amended 
information with unlawful dealing with property by a fiduciary, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-513 
(Supp. 1993) (R. 180-81). The State's theory was that defendant, 
a real estate agent representing George and Marie Bauers in the 
sale of their home, violated her fiduciary duty by selling the 
property to a stand-in purchaser ior $40,000, who immediately 
conveyed the property to another for $58,000 on a trust deed 
which the stand-in then assigned to a private financier for 
$45,000, yielding defendant an additional commission of 
$4,697.50, all at defendant's direction and without disclosure to 
the Bauers (see probable cause statement, R. 3-5). Defendant was 
convicted following a jury trial (R. 1089). The trial court 
sentenced defendant to a' term of from one to fifteen years in the 
Utah State Prison; however, execution of the sentence was stayed, 
pending defendant's compliance with the terms of her probation 
(R. 341-44). This Court later stayed all terms and conditions of 
defendant's probation, following the granting of defendant's 
application for a certificate of probable cause (R. 357-58). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On July 6, 1992, George and Marie Bauer listed their Cedar 
City home with ERA Realty Center for $45,900 (R. 792-794; Ex, 
21)• Defendant was then a real estate agent with ERA Realty (R. 
793) . 
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In the summer of 1993, eighteen-year-old Nicole Packer was 
employed by defendant as a live-in assistant to do clerical work 
and odd jobs in her real estate practice (R. 828-30, 995-96). 
Sometime in July, defendant suggested to Nicole that she buy the 
Bauers' property and then resell it at a higher price, splitting 
the profits in equal thirds between them and defendant's husband, 
attorney Kent Winward (R. 832-34, 1021). Because she trusted the 
Winwards, Nicole agreed to sign the necessary papers, although 
she had neither the intention nor the funds to buy the Bauers' 
home (R. 831, 835-39). 
On July 12, 1993, Nicole signed an earnest money agreement, 
contracting to buy the Bauers' property for $40,000. The earnest 
money agreement identified defendant as the selling agent (R. 
835, 847, 851; Earnest Money Sales Agreement, Ex. 6). Nicole did 
not know until August to whom she would sell the property, and 
she did not know the selling price until the closing (R. 840-41, 
850) . 
Meanwhile, Kent Winward approached one of his clients, 
Vickie Bassett, a beauty parlor employee, about purchasing the 
Bauers' property, which both he and defendant showed to Vickie 
(R. 875-77, 1005-07). Defendant told Vickie that the property 
could be purchased for $58,000, including a $3000 down payment. 
Neither Vickie nor her husband Dan had any money to purchase the 
house, but defendant and Kent Winward agreed to accept Bassett's 
payment of the down payment in the form of haircutting, nail and 
laundry services, with the balance of the purchase price to be 
4 
handled through private financing (R. 877-81). On July 15, 
Vickie and Dan Bassett signed an earnest money agreement, 
contracting to buy the Bauer property from Nicole Packer for 
$58,000. This earnest money agreement identified defendant as 
both the listing and selling agent "representing the seller" (R. 
738, 889-90; Ex. 10). 
Defendant located Patricia Williams to provided the 
financing the Bassetts needed from the proceeds of a 
contemporaneous sale of other property in Cedar City.2 On 
August 4, Williams signed a letter of intent authorizing Southern 
Utah Title Company to disburse $45,000 from the proceeds realized 
from the sale of the other property to Nicole Packer upon 
Nicole's assigning to Williams the $55,000 trust deed note 
received from the Bassetts (Letter of Intent and Authorization 
for Release of Funds, Ex. 23). 
The closing of all the various transactions in this case 
took place on August 6, 1993 at Cedar Land Title, Inc. (R. 733, 
736, 754, 760). The Bauers, appearing alone, sold their home to 
Nicole Packer for $40,000, less $2400 in commission and other 
closing costs (R. 742, 752-53; Settlement Statement, Ex. 8). No 
one informed the Bauers that their home was to be immediately 
resold (R. 743). According to Tom Goodman, Defendant's principal 
broker and the listing agent in this transaction, defendant would 
2
 Williams held a $70,000 note on property owned by the 
Gracelys. Defendant arranged to have the Gracelys sell the 
property to the Hayes (R. 854-55, 1006-07). The closing was 
supposed to take place on July 17, but it was delayed until July 
26 (R. 1006-07). 
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have received between $600 and $800 in commission on the Bauer-
Packer transaction (R. 796).3 
After the Bauers signed the closing papers and left, Nicole 
Packer and Vickie Bassett came in to Cedar Land Title, 
accompanied by Kent Winward, and completed their transaction: 
Nicole deeded the property to Vickie, who, without the designated 
$3,000 downpayment, purchased it for $58,000 at thirteen percent 
interest (R. 754-56, 889-90); Vickie then gave Nicole a trust 
deed in the amount of $55,000; and Nicole assigned the trust deed 
to Williams for $45,000, which sum was received, under Williams's 
instructions, from Southern Utah Title company (R. 757-60, 779, 
783) . 
Nicole testified that she signed documents whose meaning she 
did not know at Kent Winward's direction (R. 861, 865-67). She 
also stated that she never signed the second earnest money 
agreement, selling the house to the Bassetts, and thought that 
Kent Winward had probably signed it (R. 848, 852). Defendant 
never told Nicole how much profit was realized on the sale, 
though she assumed that it was $3,000 because she received $1000 
(R. 842-43). 
After deducting closing costs on the series of transactions, 
$4,697.50 was left over (R. 756). Cedar Land Title wrote a check 
payable to Nicole Packer for this amount (R. 724, 730, 749, 779; 
Ex. 1). Kent Winward picked up this check and, without telling 
3
 Defendant claimed she received only $300 in commission 
from the sale of the Bauers' property (R. 1019-20). 
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Nicole, deposited it in defendant's bank account (R. 730, 846). 
As to the Packer-Bassett transaction, ERA Realty did not 
authorize it, and Goodman neither knew anything about it nor 
received anything from it (R. 800-01, 803). Although the 
documents indicated that ERA Realty was entitled to receive a 
commission, none was disbursed on Kent Winward's instruction that 
no realty agents were involved in that sale (R. 747, 780). 
Sally Melling, the agent who handled the closings on August 
6, stated that in the eight years she worked for Cedar Land Title 
she had never participated in a closing in which a real estate 
agent immediately turned over the same piece of property or in 
which she possessed the original and all copies of the earnest 
money agreements, all of which she found unusual (733-34, 788-
89) . 
The listing agreement indicated that the Bauers wished to 
sell their home on cash terms (R. 811, 819; Ex. 21). However, 
the Bauers testified that while they were initially interested in 
cash only, they were willing to consider other offers and 
expected that all offers would be communicated to them (R. 913-
15, 929). George Bauer testified that if the right offer had 
come in, other than cash, they would have accepted it, that there 
was no agreement that only cash offers would be accepted and that 
Goodman had told them that all offers had to be forwarded to them 
(R. 930-31). 
The State's real estate expert, Lori Ann Blackner, testified 
that in order to become a licensed real estate agent one must 
7 
pass a course in which ethics and an agent's duties to his 
principal are taught (R. 969-72). Accordingly, a seller's agent 
has a duty of full disclosure and loyalty and is thereby required 
to inform the seller of anything that may affect the sale before 
closing (R. 973-76). 
Goodman stated that if either the Bassetts' $58,000 offer at 
thirteen percent or Williams' offer of $45,000 to purchase a 
discount mortgage had come in within a few days of Packer's 
offer, he would have passed it on to the Bauers because he worked 
for them and because it was his obligation. Also, if he had 
known that Nicole Packer had no money and was just standing in to 
facilitate another transaction from Williams, he would also have 
disclosed this to the Bauers (R. 823-24). 
Defendant acknowledged that one of the key lessons learned 
by real estate agents is that of loyalty and fiduciary duty and 
that she must fully disclose everything to her client (R. 1015). 
She knew all the details of the transactions (R. 1016). She had 
it in mind all along to -make a profit (R. 1021). She never told 
the Bauers that Nicole Packer was standing in to facilitate the 
transaction (R. 1036). 
Defendant never informed the Bauers of Packer's immediate 
reselling of their property to Bassett for $58,000 at thirteen 
percent interest (R. 911, 918-19, 933, 935, 958, 1017), although 
the Bauers would liked to have considered the Bassett offer in 
spite of Vickie Bassett's impecuniosity because of the high 
interest rate (R. 940-54). Defendant never informed the Bauers 
8 
of Williams' $45,000 purchase of the Packer-Bassett $55,000 trust 
deed note (R. 912, 935), although defendant acknowledged that she 
could have informed the Bauers about Williams' offer before they 
closed the deal (R. 1041). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Defendant's argument, that facts proved at trial do not make 
out offense of unlawful dealing with property by a fiduciary as 
provided by Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-513 (1990), is without factual 
or legal support. There is nothing in section 76-6-513 that 
places any restriction on the extent or nature of the entrustment 
which a fiduciary might violate. Defendant fails to cite any 
relevant authority showing that "a fiduciary entrusted with 
property" who violates her duty must, at a minimum, have either 
possession or control of the property before felony sanctions can 
be applied. Further, defendant was a real estate agent entrusted 
with property as a fiduciary. Section 76-6-513 incorporates by 
reference a broad definition of "property," which embraced 
defendant's valuable interest in representing the sellers and 
certain rights in promoting the sale of the property. 
Defendant's resort to the commentaries to section 224.13 of 
the Model Penal Code, apparently to show that felony sanctions 
were not intended by the legislature, is without merit. The 
terms of the statute are not ambiguous and the penalties very 
different than those imposed in the Model Penal Code/ therefore, 
there is no need to resort to that authority in interpreting the 
9 
statute. Furthermore, the clear language of the statute is 
supported by legislative history showing a very deliberate intent 
to apply felony sanctions to a violation of a fiduciary duty in 
the circumstances of this case, i.e., a misappropriation by the. 
fiduciary. 
POINT II 
The law requires only that the jury agree that all of the 
elements the offense be 'unanimously agreed upon by the jury. 
Unaminity does not require that the precise manner in which the 
jury found defendant to have committed the offense be apparent 
from the verdict. Rather, there need only be sufficient evidence 
on each of the theories upon which the prosecution's case was 
premised. 
In this case the critical statutory element at issue was 
whether defendant had violated her fiduciary duty as a real 
estate agent to her principals. The jury unanimously found 
beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had violated this 
element/duty. The precise manner in which defendant violated her 
duty is not a statutory element of the offense of which defendant 
was convicted. Furthermore, there was more than sufficient 
evidence regarding the defendant's violation of her duties of 
full disclosure and loyalty a seller's agent owes to her 
principal, the only two theories on which defendant requested 
special verdicts, a claim which defendant has effectively 
abandoned on appeal. 
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POINT III 
The trial court properly denied defendant's motion to 
disqualify the prosecutor and her request for an evidentiary 
hearing. Defendant neither demonstrates that any of the conduct 
discussed in her brief affected her substantial rights, nor that 
any of it was pertinent to the trial court's pre-trial denial of 
her motion and request. * Further, defendant's pre-trial 
allegations in support of her request and motion failed to 
adequately establish her claim and are unsupported by adequate 
legal argument or authority. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT A 
FIDUCIARY NEED NOT HAVE COMPLETE CONTROL OR 
POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY IN ORDER TO BE 
"ENTRUSTED WITH PROPERTY AS A FIDUCIARY" 
UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-513 (1990) 
Defendant claims that the facts proved at trial do not make 
out an offense under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-513 (1990)/ and 
4
 Section 76-6-513 was enacted in 1973. In its original 
form the offense was a misdemeanor. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-513 
(Supp. 1973) (History: 1973 Laws, ch. 196, § 76-6-513). In 1983 
the statute was amended, expressly making the offense a "theft," 
as defined in the statute, punishable under section 76-6-412. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-513 (Supp. 1983) (History: 1973 Laws, ch. 
91, § 1) (attached at Addendum A). This version of the statute 
was in force when defendant committed the offense. The statute 
was next amended, to its present version, in 1994. 1994 Laws, 
ch. 70, § 1, effective May 2, 1994. Among other changes, this 
most recent amendment excised the term "theft,11 while retaining 
sanctions punishable under section 76-6-412. Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-513 (Cum. Supp. 1994) . Thus, the parties at trial would 
have referred to Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-513 (1990), codifying the 
1983 amendment, and all references to the 1983 amendment in this 
brief are to this edition of the code. 
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therefore, her felony conviction under that statute should be 
reversed. Appellant's Br. at 9, 25. Specifically, defendant 
argues that section 76-6-513 derives from Model Penal Code 
section 224.13, which punishes mishandling of entrusted property 
as a misdemeanor. She further argues that the trial court's 
interpretation of the term "entrusted with property as a 
fiduciary" improperly allows the imposition of felony sanctions 
for mere breaches of ethical standards of conduct, an 
inappropriately harsh punishment, unintended by the legislature 
where defendant's "entrustment" is based neither on her 
possession nor control of the property. Defendant's claims are 
without factual or legal merit. 
A. The Trial Court Properly Ruled that 
Defendant was "Entrusted With Property 
as a Fiduciary" under Section 76-6-513. 
Defendant argued in the trial court that she could not have 
been entrusted with property over which she had neither 
possession nor the power to pledge, convey or encumber as though 
having a power of attorney (R. 317-18, 725-26, 986). On appeal, 
defendant's argument is that she is at most guilty of a conscious 
breach of ethics. In order to raise such a breach to a criminal 
offense under section 76-6-513, defendant argues, an actor must 
have at least possession and control of property entrusted to her 
as a fiduciary. Since she did not have such possession or 
control, section 76-6-513 is not applicable to her case. 
Appellant's Br. at 14-16. Defendant's argument fails for several 
reasons. 
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There is nothing in section 76-6-513 that places any 
restriction on the extent or nature of the entrustment which a 
fiduciary might violate. Defendant has cited absolutely no 
authority for the proposition that a fiduciary, having neither 
possession nor control of property is immune from felony 
sanctions for conduct which is also a breach of ethics. Instead, 
defendant, relies exclusively on hypotheticals which she 
implicitly assumes could not be contemplated by the statute. 
Interestingly, she does not even rely on the commentaries to the 
Model Penal Code to support her argument, which, in fact, offer 
no support for her position. Most tellingly, however, defendant 
was actually entrusted with property as defined by the statute. 
Thus, defendant's violation of her fiduciary duty with respect to 
that entrustment of property makes her conduct culpable under 
section 76-6-513. 
Utah's penal statutes should be broadly construed "according 
to the fair import of their terms to promote justice and to 
effect the objects of the law and the general purposes of Section 
76-1-104." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-106 (1990) .5 See State v. 
5
 Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-104, provides: 
The provisions of this code shall be construed in 
accordance with these general purposes. 
(1) Forbid and prevent the commission of offenses. 
(2) Define adequately the conduct and mental 
state which constitute each offense and 
safeguard conduct that is without fault from 
condemnation as criminal. 
(3) Prescribe penalties which are proportionate to the 
seriousness of offenses and which permit recognition or 
differences in rehabilitation possibilities among 
individual offenders. 
13 
Framoton, 737 P.2d 183, 192 (Utah 1987) (broadly construing the 
criminal simulation statute, Utah Code Ann. §76-8-518 (1990), to 
include baseball mitts within its terms in the face of the 
defendant's claim that the statute failed to specify the type of 
goods in question and that similar criminal simulation statutes 
had been interpreted narrowly as covering only unique chattels, 
such as antiques or paintings). 
Relevant to this discussion, the operative phrase in section 
76-6-513 is f,deal[ing] with property that has been entrusted to 
him as a fiduciary" Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-513(1) (1990). 
Section 76-6-513 incorporates by reference the definition of 
"property" in Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-4 01 (1995), which includes 
"anything of value, including real estate, . . . and written 
instruments or other writings representing or embodying rights 
concerning real property." Section 76-6-513(2), 6-401 (emphasis 
added). 
This broad definition readily encompasses the property 
entrusted to defendant as a fiduciary. It requires no citation 
to authority that defendant's real estate representation of the 
Bauers was property, i.e., a valuable business interest. More 
particularly, the listing agreement under which defendant was 
employed gave certain enumerated powers to defendant for the 
purpose of accomplishing her agency. Among those powers were the 
power to receive earnest money and place it in trust, the 
(4) Prevent arbitrary or oppressive treatment of 
persons accused or convicted of offenses. 
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authority to obtain financial information from any mortgagee or 
other party holding a lien on the property, the right to place a 
sign on the property, the power to list the property through the 
Multiple Listing Service of the Board of Realtors, and the 
authority to install a key box on the property (see Ex. 21, 
attached at Addendum B). 
Furthermore, in addition to the powers specifically 
enumerated under the listing agreement, an agent has other 
implied powers which are necessary to perform the specifically 
granted powers. See generally, 12 C.J.S. Brokers § 45 (Ed.. 
Among these powers is the power to enter into the house at any 
time for the purpose of showing the property to a potential 
buyer. Defendant testified that she showed the house to Vickie 
Bassett (R. 1031), although she felt she was not acting as an 
agent but rather as an interior decorator (R. 1031), a contention 
the jury was free to reject. See State v. Jonas, 793 P.2d 902, 
904-05 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 804 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1990) (jury 
is free to believe or disbelieve all or part of any witness's 
testimony). 
In denying to defendant's motion to dismiss, the trial court 
ruled that there was sufficient evidence to show that ERA and its 
agents were entrusted with "a measure of control and 
responsibility for this property," which included "showing the 
property to people and making statements to people about the 
property and . . . informing people of the response of the 
Bauers" (R. 989). In denying defendant's motion to arrest 
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judgment, the trial court rejected defendant's hypothetical, 
stating: 
THE COURT: The Court has reviewed that 
memorandum and there is some persuasive power 
behind the arguments presented therein, but 
the Court is not convinced by them. The 
counsel for the defense has presented 
different hypotheticals and said that under 
-- the way the Court's interpreted the 
statute, those people might be convicted of 
the same offense and I agree and I think they 
would appropriately be convicted of the same 
offense. Whenever someone has a fiduciary 
duty and is entrusted with some 
responsibility, some measure of control with 
regard to something of value and knowingly 
fails to fulfill that duty, it's -- it should 
be a criminal offense. 
(R. 1101-02).6 
Defendant argues at length that the commentaries to section 
224.13 of the Model Penal Code explain the application of section 
76-6-513 (see discussion below), that no state adopting the Model 
Penal Code has construed it so broadly and that there is no 
indication that the Utah legislature so intended. Appellant's 
Br. at 16. Defendant misapprehends the statute and the 
legislature's power. 
The general directive that criminal statute's should be 
construed to forbid criminal offenses, Utah Code Ann. 
6
 There is no challenge to the trial court's finding that 
as a real estate agent, defendant owed a fiduciary duty to the 
Bauers. It is well settled in Utah case law that a "real estate 
broker and his agents are the agents of a property owner from 
whom the broker has a listing, and the broker and his agents owe 
a fiduciary duty to the property owner.11 Kidd v. Maldonado, 688 
P.2d 461 (Utah 1984)(emphasis added). Hal Taylor Associates v. 
Unionamerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 743, 748 (Utah 1982); see Hopkins v. 
Wardley Corp.. 611 P.2d 1204 (Utah 1980). 
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§ 76-1-104 (1995), and particularly the statute's broad 
definitions with respect to property, support the conclusion that 
the legislature intended to make culpable defendant's type of 
conduct. The legislature has power to declare acts as crimes and 
to prescribe proper penalties. State v. Gallion, 572 P.2d 683, 
688 (Utah 1977); State v. Green, 793 P.2d 912, 915 (Utah App. 
1990). The only limitation on the legislative power to determine 
criminal penalties is that they not be cruel or unusual. State 
v. Green, 757 P.2d 462, 463 (Utah 1988). There is no claim that 
the felony sanctions of section 76-6-513 are cruel or unusual.7 
Since defendant was entrusted with property as provided in the 
statute, her claim denying such entrustment is invalid and should 
be rejected. 
B. Section 76-6-513 is Significantly Different 
than its Model Penal Code Progenitor, and 
the Utah Statute Expressly Provides Felony 
Sanctions for Defendant's Conduct. 
1. Utah Courts have Looked to Other Methods of 
Statutory Interpretation Only When the Plain 
Language of the Statute is Ambiguous. 
Section 76-6-513, provides: 
(1) A person is guilty of theft, punishable 
under section 76-6-412, if he deals with 
property that has been entrusted to him as a 
fiduciary, or property of the government or 
of a financial institution, in a manner which 
he knows is a violation of his duty and which 
7
 Defendant nominally argues that section 76-6-513 cannot 
be constitutionally applied to criminalize defendant's conduct 
under the facts of the case for lack of public notice. 
Appellant's Br. at 16. Defendant did not raise this argument in 
the trial court, and therefore the claim is waived on appeal. 
State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 359 (Utah App. 1993). 
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involves substantial risk of loss to the 
owner or to a person for whose benefit the 
property was entrusted. 
(2) As used in this section "fiduciary" 
includes any person carrying on fiduciary 
functions on behalf of a corporation or other 
organization which is a fiduciary. . . . 
"[P]roperty has the meaning given in section 
76-6-401(1) . 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-513 (1990) . 
When interpreting statutory language Utah courts first 
examine a statute's plain language. State v. Masciantonio, 850 
P.2d 492, 493 (Utah App. 1993); State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843, 845 
(Utah 1992). Courts will turn to other methods of statutory 
interpretation only if the language of the statute is ambiguous. 
Id. Therefore, before turning to the Model Penal Code 
Commentaries defendant must show that the language in section 
76-6-513 is ambiguous. 
The statutory elements of the offense are clearly stated, 
see section 76-6-513(1), and all relevant terms are defined. Id. 
at (2). The language of the statute plainly indicates that the 
culpable conduct is punishable as a theft under section 76-6-412, 
which punishment may be -a felony. Id. at (1). Therefore, 
defendant's resort to the commentaries to the Model Penal Code 
for aid in determining the intended scope of prohibited conduct 
is misplaced. 
Defendant mistakenly cites Frampton, as authority for 
resorting to the Model Penal Code. Frampton turned to the Model 
Penal Code because the legislature failed to define the meaning 
of "value defrauded or intended to be defrauded" under Utah Code 
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Ann. § 76-6-513(1). The difference between what was actually 
stolen and what was intended to be stolen could elevate the 
offense from a felony of the third degree to a felony of the 
second degree. Frampton, 737 P.2d at 194. The legislature made 
no indication which of the amounts was to be controlling. 
Furthermore, there was no "meaningful legislative history 
concerning 76-6-513." Id. at 195. It was in this context that 
the court turned to the Model Penal Code for assistance in 
grading the offenses of the statute. 
Frampton is distinguished from the present case because the 
provisions of section 76-6-513 are clear and there exists a 
meaningful legislative history concerning the intended severity 
of the offense. During the floor debate on HB 281, amending 
section 76-6-513, Mr. Karras, the bill's sponsor, repeatedly 
stated that the purpose of the amendment was to increase to 
felony levels the penalty applied to a fiduciary that 
misappropriated property of another.8 Because both section 
76-6-513 and its legislative history are clear that felony 
penalties may be applied to an actor who, entrusted with 
property, violates her fiduciary duty, resort to the comments to 
* Specifically, Representative Karras stated: "We are just 
trying to make some similarities, really, in saying that if 
someone does misappropriate funds as a fiduciary, someone that 
has responsibility for someone else's money, that the punishment 
is increased." 
Representative Killyard also referred to the increased 
punishment by saying, "I think the real thing this bill does is 
bring theft of a . . . by a fiduciary into the same 
classifications of theft as it would be by anyone else. . .it 
just makes it consistent throughout the Code" (see transcript of 
floor debate on HB 281, attached at Addendum C). 
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the Model Penal Code is unnecessary to interpret section 
76-6-513. 
2. The Trial Court Correctly Recognized that 
that Model Penal Code was Not Useful in 
Interpreting Section 76-6-513. 
In any event, because section 76-6-513 is so different from 
section 224.15 of the Model Penal Code,9 neither the model 
statute nor its associated commentaries throw any light on the 
application of section 76-6-513 that would support defendant's 
challenge concerning "entrusted with property by a fiduciary" or 
the propriety of imposing felony sanctions. At trial defendant 
first challenged the application of section 76-6-513 to the facts 
of the case (R. 961-62), and later moved to dismiss for failure 
to make out a prima facie case (R. 984-89), arguing that the 
offense was patterned on section 224.13 of the Model Penal Code; 
thus, defendant argued, the gravamen of the Utah offense involved 
9
 Section 224.13 of the Model Penal Code provides: 
A person commits an offense if he applies or 
disposes of property that has been entrusted 
to him as a fiduciary, or property of the 
government or.of a financial institution, in 
a manner which he knows is unlawful and 
involves substantial risk of loss or 
detriment to the owner of the property or to 
a person for whose benefit the property was 
entrusted. The offense is a misdemeanor if 
the amount involved exceeds $50; otherwise it 
is a petty misdemeanor. "Fiduciary" includes 
trustee, guardian, executor, administrator, 
receiver and any person carrying on fiduciary 
functions on behalf of a corporation or other 
organization which is a fiduciary. 
Model Penal Code and Commentaries § 224.13 (Official Draft and 
Revised Comments 1980) (attached at Addendum D). 
20 
the reckless endangerment of property entrusted to a fiduciary 
(see Defendant's Trial Brief, R. 269-71, citing the Model Penal 
Code and Commentaries, §224.13 comment 1 at 358-59; R. 961-62). 
The trial court rejected defendant's theory: 
THE COURT: I understand your theory, Mr. 
Pendleton, that this statute has to be 
interpreted the way the Model Penal Code 
statute was interpreted as being directed at 
how someone cares for property placed in 
custody, but it's fairly clear to me that the 
Model Penal Code history is not helpful at 
all because of the substantial revisions that 
the Utah Legislature made to this. It's 
really quite apparent to me that this is a 
different statute after the Utah Legislature 
changed it. Those were not just minor 
revisions and that it intended to deal not 
just how someone manages the investments of 
others --
(R. 962). In sum, the trial court correctly recognized that 
defendant's resort to the Model Penal Code was inappropriate in 
interpreting section 76-6-513, and thereby correctly denied 
defendant's motions for acquittal and to arrest judgment 
challenging the application of the statute. 
POINT II 
THE ABSENCE OF A JURY INSTRUCTION REGARDING 
UNANIMITY DOES NOT WARRANT REVERSAL BECAUSE 
DEFENDANT'S CHALLENGE RELATES TO THE METHOD 
BY WHICH THE CRIME WAS COMMITTED, NOT ITS 
ELEMENTS 
Defendant argues that reversal is warranted because the 
trial court did not require unaminity by the jurors concerning 
the nature of unlawful dealing with property by a fiduciary. 
Appellant's Br. at 17-18. Specifically, defendant appears to 
challenge the trial court's refusal to provide the jury with 
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special verdict forms that allegedly would have identified which 
aspect of defendant's fiduciary duty she breached or what conduct 
constituted the breach of fiduciary duty required under section 
76-6-513. Appellant's Br, at 18. As a result of the trial 
court's alleged error, defendant argues, the verdict does not 
reflect the jury's unanimous conviction based on an identifiable, 
viable theory of culpability. Appellant's Br. at 20-21. 
Defendant's argument is without merit for a variety of reasons. 
A. Defendant has Abandoned Her Claim on Appeal. 
At trial, defendant sought special verdicts to determine 
whether the jury's verdict that defendant violated her fiduciary 
duty was based on a violation of the duty of full disclosure or 
of the duty of loyalty (R. 1061) . On appeal, defendant argues 
the trial court erred in refusing to submit the case on special 
verdicts. Appellant's Br. at 17-21. However, defendant does not 
argue on appeal under State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150 (Utah 
1991) , upon which he relies, that the evidence was insufficient 
to support a verdict under breaches of either (or both) the 
duties of loyalty or of full disclosure, as she must under 
Johnson. Instead, defendant argues, somewhat ambiguously, that 
the trial court erred in denying his motion for acquittal, citing 
the trial court's holding that there was sufficient evidence on 
two grounds to support a jury finding on defendant's violation of 
her duty of full disclosure to the Bauers, i.e., defendant's 
failure to disclose the essentially contemporaneous 
Packer/Bassett sale and-that Nicole Packer was a "cash" buyer 
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without cash (R. 990). This argument fails to develop 
defendant's claim at trial that special verdicts were necessary 
to distinguish the basis of a jury finding on breach of fiduciary 
duty, and defendant has, thereby, effectively abandoned her claim 
on appeal. See State v. Shaffer, 725 P.2d 1301, 1307 n.2 (Utah 
1986) (finding issues raised in a motion in limine but not 
included in the appeal brief abandoned on appeal). Pixton v. 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 809 P.2d 746, 751 (Utah App. 
1991) (failure to discuss or brief issue raised at trial 
constitutes waiver of issue on appeal). In any event, 
defendant's claim is without merit. 
B. Unaminity on the Precise Manner in 
Which Defendant Violated her Fiduciary 
Duty was Not Required. 
1. The Law. 
In State v. Russell, the Utah Supreme Court held that 
unanimity was not required in a case in which all three of the 
possible statutory mens rea requirements were charged in a second 
degree murder conviction. The court stated: 
The decisions are virtually unanimous that a 
defendant is not entitled to a unanimous 
verdict on the precise manner in which the 
crime was committed, or by which of several 
alternative methods or modes, or under which 
interpretation of the evidence, so long as 
there is substantial evidence to support each 
of the methods, modes or manners charged. 
State v. Russell, 733 P.2d 162, 165 (Utah 1987)). See State v. 
Powell, 872 P.2d 1027, 1032 (Utah 1994) (reaffirming and quoting 
Russell with approval on the same facts). 
State v. Johnson, reiied on by defendant, is consistent with 
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this view. State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d at 1159. In Johnson, the 
court reversed the defendant's conviction on one of the counts of 
attempted first degree murder for lack of unanimity on the 
elements where there was insufficient evidence to support both of 
the statutory aggravating circumstances. Id. In so ruling, the 
court stated: 
A majority of this court has stated that a 
jury must be unanimous on all elements of a 
criminal charge for the conviction to stand. 
See rstate v.1 Tillman, 750 P.2d [546], 585-88 
(Durham, J., concurring & dissenting); id. at 
591 (Zimmerman, J., concurring & dissenting); 
id. at 577-80 (Stewart, J., concurring in the 
result). From this premise, it follows that a 
general verdict of guilty cannot stand if the 
State's case was premised on more than one 
factual or legal theory of the elements of 
the crime and any one of those theories is 
flawed or lacks the requisite evidentiary 
foundation. In such circumstances, it is 
impossible to determine whether the jury 
agreed unanimously on all of the elements of 
a valid and evidentially supported theory of 
the elements of the crime. [Emphasis added.] 
Id. 
Defendant misconstrues Johnson to mean that for every 
element constituting the offense, the jury must be unanimous 
beyond a reasonable doubt as to every means by which that element 
may be satisfied. Johnson, rather, demands only that where a 
general verdict of guilt is returned there be sufficient evidence 
for each factual theory relied on by the prosecution. 
In this case, there is only one statutory element at issue 
in defendant's challenge on unanimity, i.e., violation of a 
fiduciary duty. The instructions, collectively, required the 
jury to unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant 
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had violated her fiduciary duty before it could render a verdict 
of guilt (jury instructions #8, #9, #14; R. 299-98, 293, attached 
at Addendum E). The jury found defendant guilty and a polling 
showed the verdict unanimous (see verdict, R. 308; R. 1089-90). 
2. There was More Than Sufficient Evidence 
to Support the .Two Prosecution Theories 
for Which Defendant Sought Special Verdicts. 
Assuming that defendant's references to the trial court's 
denying defendant's motion for acquittal can be regarded as 
relevant to her claim on appeal, the claim fails to show that the 
two theories on which she suggested special verdicts be given the 
jury were defective under Johnson. The trial court gave an 
instruction defining the duties of loyalty and disclosure (jury 
instruction #11, R. 296, attached at Addendum E). On appeal 
defendant fails entirely to marshal the evidence supporting 
defendant's violation of these two theories upon which the State 
premised its case. Moreover, defendant attacks only the 
sufficiency of evidence to support the failure to disclose that 
Packer lacked cash. Appellant's Br. at 21. Thus, defendant 
apparently concedes that there was sufficient evidence to support 
a finding that defendant had violated her duty of disclosure by 
failing to inform the Bauers that she already had a buyer, i.e., 
the Bassetts, waiting in the wings to purchase the Bauers' 
residence for $58,000 at 13% interest. Indeed, this was only one 
of the many facts supporting the prosecution's theory of 
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nondisclosure. 
Further, defendant's argument that there was insufficient 
evidence to support a finding that she did not disclose that 
Packer was without cash is nothing but a strawman argument. For 
the purposes of assessing sufficiency on the factual theories 
under Johnson, the question is whether the prosecution's case was 
premised on Packer's financial condition. See Johnson, 821 P.2d 
at 1159. Packer's financial condition was, at most, one fact 
among a great many to support the prosecution's case for 
nondisclosure.11 The prosecution did not even identify this 
particular fact as a theory in arguing defendant's violation of 
her fiduciary duty to the jury in closing.12 
10
 Only a few of the facts also supporting defendant's 
violation of her duty of full disclosure were: Nicole Packer was 
merely a pawn in the transaction standing in for defendant in the 
transaction, one who was only eighteen years old, had neither the 
funds nor the intent to buy a home, and was kept substantially 
ignorant of her sale to the Bassetts until the closing (R. 829, 
831, 835-41, 850); the Bauer/Packer transaction was virtually 
contemporaneous with the Packer/Bassett transaction, since the 
parties were signing papers within hours of one another (R. 744-
45); defendant was effectively hiding the Packer/Bassett sale by 
neither informing ERA or claiming a commission (R. 747, 780, 790, 
801, 807, 821-22); defendant should have passed on William's 
offer of $45,000 to the Bauers (R. 824); defendant failed to pass 
on to the Bauers the Bassetts' $58,000 offer at 13% interest (R. 
911) . 
11
 Supra, n.10. 
12
 The State's theory at trial was that defendant had 
violated her fiduciary duty to the Bauers by failing to disclose 
that (1) the property was being sold to defendant's secretary, 
Nicole Packer, (2) the Bassetts were willing to pay $55,000 at 
thirteen percent interest for the house (3) that Williams had 
$45,000 available for the purchase of the Bauers' house or (4) 
that an additional commission of $4,697 would be split between 
defendant, her husband and Nicole Packer (R. 1075). 
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Finally, in referencing alleged deficiencies in the trial 
court's view of the evidence, defendant's argument on appeal 
focusses only on the failure to fully disclose. She entirely 
fails to show how giving a special verdict on the failure of the 
duty of loyalty would have distinguished the facts supporting 
that theory from the theory that defendant failed to fulfill her 
duty of disclosure. In fact, defendant never provided the trial 
court with the special verdict forms that he requested (see 
defendant's proposed jury instructions, R. 248-61). 
In any event, there was more than sufficient evidence to 
prove that defendant had violated her duty of loyalty. The trial 
court defined this duty as the fiduciary's obligation to put the 
seller's interests ahead of her own (see jury instruction #11, R. 
296). The most powerful fact in support of this particular 
theory upon which the prosecution premised its case (R. 1075), 
was that defendant obtained $4,697.50 in commission, i.e., left 
over funds following the various transactions, which she split 
with her husband and Nicole Packer (R. 730, 778-79, 790, 834) . 
In sum, there was more than sufficient evidence to support 
the prosecution's theories upon which defendant requested special 
verdicts, and therefore, defendant's claim that the general 
verdict of guilt cannot stand. 
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT EXERCISED APPROPRIATE 
DISCRETION IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR 
AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON HER MOTION TO 
DISQUALIFY THE PROSECUTOR 
Defendant contends that the lower court erred when it denied 
her motion for an evidentiary hearing on her motion to disqualify 
the prosecutor. She summarily asserts that the trial court was 
required to hold an evidentiary hearing "to test the truthfulness 
of the allegations." Appellant's Br. at 25. 
A. Defendant's Claim is Waived on Appeal. 
In support of her claim that the trial court erred in 
denying a hearing on the motion, defendant sets out what she 
claims are examples of the prosecutor's "intent to obtain a 
conviction at the expense of affording the defendant a fair 
trial." Appellant's Br. at 22-24. She then closes her argument 
by submitting that "the alleged conduct in fact disqualifies the 
prosecutor[.]" Appellant's Br. at 25. To the extent she means 
that the conduct argued in her brief disqualifies the prosecutor, 
she has not met her burden of proving her allegations. She does 
not demonstrate that these examples constitute misconduct which 
"affected a substantial right of the defendant." Gray, 851 P.2d 
at 1228. Further, none of the examples was before the lower 
court at the time it ruled on defendant's pre-trial request for a 
hearing. Consequently, these examples have no bearing on whether 
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the trial court's denial of defendant's motion was erroneous.13 
To the extent she claims that the pre-trial conduct alleged 
below in support of her motion for an evidentiary hearing 
disqualifies the prosecutor, defendant did not adequately 
establish the claim below and fails to make any attempt to 
establish it in her appellate brief. She makes no argument 
concerning why an evidentiary hearing was required given the 
allegations and arguments before the lower court at the time of 
its ruling. Utah R. App. P. 24(a) (9); see State v. Stercrer, 808 
P.2d 122, 125 n.2 (Utah App. 1991) (declining to rule on 
arguments unsupported by meaningful analysis). Moreover, 
defendant has not appended to her brief the findings of fact that 
would make clear the basis for the trial court's denial of her 
motion and request for an evidentiary hearing, thereby depriving 
this court of the ability to review the correctness of that 
determination. Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(11)(C). Accordingly, this 
Court should not consider her claim of error. 
B. Defendant Fails to Show that the 
Prosecutor Should have been Disqualified. 
Defendant moved to 'disqualify the prosecutor shortly after 
13Even if the court were to find the alleged instances of 
prosecutorial misconduct at trial were relevant, a clear reading 
of the record shows the instances cited by the appellant can not 
be construed as misconduct. Each of the defense objections cited 
were made when the prosecutor inadvertently referred to the offer 
from Mrs. Williams as a cash offer, when it was in reality an 
offer to purchase a mortgage. It is worthy to note that each 
time the prosecutor rephrased the question, the question was 
allowed and was not objected to by defendant (R. 912, 935). 
Consequently, the evidence admitted was that which the jury was 
entitled to consider in reaching its verdict. State v. Emmett, 
839 P.2d 781, 785 (Utah 1992). 
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the preliminary hearing, alleging that the prosecutor had 
committed perjury in the statement of probable cause, "accosted" 
defense counsel in the courthouse during a preliminary hearing 
recess "apparently for the purpose of some physical altercation," 
and harbored "an irrational and unjustifiable animus" toward 
defendant and her husband (R. 68-70). After the State filed its 
response to the disqualification motion (R. 75-104), defendant 
sought an evidentiary hearing because "the State's response to 
defendant's motion raises several factual issues relating to [the 
prosecutor's] good faith or lack thereof" which defendant felt 
could only be resolved in an evidentiary hearing (R. 114). 
At a hearing on defendant's motion,14 the trial court 
listened to both sides, asked defense counsel for Utah authority 
for removing the prosecutor (Hng. at 37),15 to which defense 
counsel replied, "Only the Canon of Ethics, Your Honor" (Hng. at 
The trial court then denied the motion for an evidentiary 
hearing, providing the following reasoning: 
I do not appreciate attorneys dealing with 
one another in less than professional 
14
 Defendant's husband, Kent Winward, made the same motion 
to disqualify the prosecutor and the motions in both cases were 
heard at the same time. The only copy of the transcript to the 
above-referenced hearing is a part of the record in Kent 
Winward's appeal, no. 940530-CA, though supplemented to this 
record by a ruling of the district court (see Ruling on Motion 
for Modification of Record, unpaginated, final document in 
district court record in this case), and can be located in that 
case. Because the trial court sealed the record of the hearing, 
the State has not appended copies of the transcript to this 
brief. 
15
 To which defense counsel replied, "Only the Canon of 
Ethics, Your Honor" (Hng. at 37). 
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settings. It is unseemly for attorneys to 
shout at one another, for attorneys to be in 
close contact such as they are quoted to be 
in each other's face. I don't like to see 
it. I don't like to see it operating in my 
courtroom. I don't like to see it operating 
in litigation over which I am presiding. 
It is the specific order of the Court to 
both counsel, and entered in the minutes of 
this case, that both counsel will deal with 
one another without voices raised, that they 
shall not approach each other any closer than 
one yard, 36 inches. That their voices shall 
not be audible more than 30 feet away from 
any conversation that they have. As I have 
indicated, I'm not going to put up with 
sandbox squabbles. We've got a lawsuit here 
that has serious implications for the State 
of Utah and for these defendants, and we're 
going to treat it as the kind of serious 
lawsuit that it is. 
(Hng. at 44-45). A review of all of the allegations leveled 
against the prosecutor by defense counsel reveals that the 
defense offered no concrete evidence, supplied no witness names, 
and gave no documents supporting her allegations (Hng. at 34-36). 
Based on such unsupported, conclusory accusations the court was 
perfectly justified in refusing to grant the defendant's motion. 
In her memorandum of authority at the pre-trial hearing and 
on appeal, defendant relies on a single case to support her right 
to have an evidentiary hearing. In State v. Marcotte. 86 So.2d 
186, 188 (1956), the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the trial 
court should have heard evidence on defendant's motion to recuse 
the district attorney. However, the decision was based on a 
local rule of criminal procedure "providing the causes for 
recusation of a district attorney" and upon a single prior 
Louisiana case, State v. Tate, 171 So. 108 (1936), with which the 
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author of the opinion and the dissenting justice disagreed. A 
third justice was absent and did not take part in the decision. 
Utah has no equivalent rule or precedent. There is no basis 
upon which defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on her 
allegations. The prosecutor provided to the trial court all the 
information on which he based the challenged assertions in the 
probable cause statement and evidence refuting defendant's claims 
of personal vindictiveness (R. 75-104) (attached at Addendum F). 
A review of those documents establishes that the prosecutor 
presented the bases for probable cause in good faith and to the 
best of his ability based on the information available to him at 
the time. Those documents also effectively refute defendant's 
claims of prosecutorial animosity towards them. Defendant's 
allegations reflect at most ethical questions more appropriately 
addressed through the state bar--a method recognized by defendant 
but ultimately rejected by her (Hng. at 41-42). In fact, 
defendant made the same -defense allegations of prosecutorial 
misconduct complained of at this hearing to the Attorney General 
and the State Bar (Hng. R. 29). However, the State Bar took no 
action against Mr. Burns because Mr. Pendleton refused to sign an 
affidavit, under oath, in connection with the complaint (R. 42). 
The trial court had before it sufficient information from 
both sides to determine that an evidentiary hearing was not 
appropriate and that the case could proceed without a 
substituting another prosecutor. Defendant's bald assertion on 
appeal that the conduct she alleged against the prosecutor "in 
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fact disqualifies the prosecutor" does nothing to establish her 
right either to an evidentiary hearing or to disqualification of 
the prosecutor. Accordingly, defendant's allegation of error is 
without merit. 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT AND WRITTEN OPINION 
Defendant's claim that the facts of the case do not make out 
a public offense under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-513 (Supp. 1993), 
warrant oral argument and a full-blown opinion to further develop 
Utah law in this area. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing discussion, the State respectfully 
requests that defendant's conviction be affirmed.the trial 
court's ruling and defendant's sentences be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /T day of July, 1995. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
KENNETH A. BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
76-1-101 CRIMINAL CODE 
Section Section 
76-1-404. Concurrent jurisdiction — Proa- 76-1-502. 
ecution in other jurisdiction 
barring prosecution in state. 76-1-603. 
76-1-406. Subsequent prosecution not 76-1-604*. 
barred — Circumstances. 
Parts 
Burden of Proof 
76-1-601. Presumption of innocence — "Ele-
ment of the offense" denned. 76-1-601. 
PARTI 
INTRODUCTORY PROVISIONS 
76-1*101. Short title. 
This title shall he known and may be cited as the "Utah Criminal Code." 
History: C. 1963, 70-1-101, enacted by L. Criminal and Juvenile Justice, | 63-26-1 at 
1973, ch. 196, | 76-1-101. aeq. 
Croaa-Refereneee. — Stats Commission on 
76-1-102. Effective date. 
This code shall become effective on July 1,1973. 
History: C. 1963, 76-1-103, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196,ft 764-102. 
76-1-103. Application of code — Offense prior to effective 
date. 
(1) The provisions of this code shall govern the construction of, the punish-
ment for, and defenses against any offense defined in this code or, except where 
otherwise specifically provided or the context otherwise requires, any offense 
defined outside this code; provided such offense was committed after the 
effective date of this code. 
(2) Any offense committed prior to the effective date of this code shall be 
governed by the law, statutory and non-statutory, existing at the time of 
commission thereof, except that a defense or limitation on punishment 
available under this code shall be available to any defendant tried or retried 
after the effective date. An offense under the laws of this state shall be deemed 
to have been committed prior to the effective date of this act if any of the 
elements of the offense occurred prior thereto. 
History: C. 1953,76-1-108, enacted by L» 
1973, ch. 196, 8 76-1-103. 
Negating defense by allegation or 
proof— When not required. 
Presumption of fact 
Affirmative defense presented by 
defendant. 
Parte 
Definitions 
Definitions. 
2 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 76-1-104 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALY8I8 
Offense defined outside Criminal Code. 
Sentencing. 
—After effective date of Code. 
Under statute subsequently amended. 
Offense defined outside Criminal Code. 
The Controlled Substances Act expressly and 
specifically establishes the offense of arranging 
for the distribution of a controlled substance; 
therefore, pursuant to former ft 68-37-19 and 
this section, defendant was required to be 
charged with that offense under ft 68-37-
8(lXaXiv) of the Controlled Substances Act, 
and it was error to charge him under ft 70-2-
202 of the Criminal Code. State v. Hicken, 669 
P.2d 1038 (Utah 1983). 
A person cannot be charged with aiding and 
abetting another when he or she handles the 
negotiations and price of a controlled sub-
stance, but must instead be charged with 
agreeing, consenting, offering, or negotiating to 
distribute a controlled substance as specifically 
provided in ft 68-37-8(1 XaXiv). State v. Scott, 
732 P.2d 117 (Utah 1987). 
Whenever culpable conduct arises under the 
Controlled Substance Act and is specifically 
defined by it, trial courts must reject instruc-
tions to the jury under more general provisions 
outside the act. SUte v. Scott, 732 P.2d 117 
(Utah 1987). 
Sentencing. 
—Alter effective date of Code. 
Nonstatutory law existing at the time of 
commission of crime included decisions holding 
accused entitled to benefit of lesser punishment 
if penalty for offense is reduced before imposi-
tion of sentence; therefore, one convicted of 
passing check without sufficient funds in viola-
tion of former Section 76-20-11 was entitled to 
be sentenced under less severe provisions of 
Section 76-6-606 of the new Criminal Code. 
State v. Saxton, 30 Utah 2d 466, 619 P.2d 1340 
(1974). 
In sentencing defendant who had pled guilty 
to sodomy under former Section 76-63-22, trial 
judge was not required to take into account 
reduced penalty for the crime under new stat-
ute, since it divided former offense into crimes 
of "sodomy" and "forcible sodomy," so that tech-
nically the penalty for the crime of which de-
fendant was convicted was not reduced, and 
because trial judge did take change in law into 
account and held hearing to determine which 
provision of new code applied to defendant's 
act, defendant could not complain of entry of 
sentence under "forcible sodomy" provisions'. 
State v. Atkinson, 632 P.2d 216 (Utah 1976). 
Under statute subsequently amended. 
Law in effect at time of sentencing, not law in 
effect at time of incarceration, governed sen-
tence to be served; defendant who was con-
victed and sentenced for forgery before amend-
ment of applicable statute to provide a lesser 
penalty but who was not incarcerated until 
after the amendment was not entitled to be 
resentenced under the amended statute; sen-
tencing under old statute was not a denial of 
equal protection. Harris v. Smith, 641 P.2d 343 
(Utah 1976). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jar. 2d.—21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law 
1 7 . 
C.J.8. — 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law ft 26. 
Key Number*. — Criminal Law *» 1206. 
76-1-104. Purposes and principles pf construction. 
The provisions of this code shall be construed in accordance with these 
general purposes. ' 
(1) Forbid and prevent the commission of offenses. 
(2) Define adequately the conduct and mental state which constitute 
each offense and safeguard conduct that is without fault from condemna-
tion as criminal. 
(3) Prescribe penalties which are proportionate to the seriousness of 
offenses and which permit recognition or differences in rehabilitation 
possibilities among individual offenders. 
(4) Prevent arbitrary or oppressive treatment of persons accused oi 
convicted of offenses. 
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76-1-105 CRIMINAL COM 
History: C. 1953, 73-1-104, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196,1 76-1-104. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Proportionate penalties. Determining whether the penalty is propor-
A case-by-case (comparative) proportionality tionate to the crime requires a careful and 
review was not required in response to defen- thoughtful consideration of the individual de-
dant's contention that his sentence of death fendant and the circumstances surrounding his 
was disproportionate to the crime committed, crime. Focus on the individual defendant and 
the immunity granted his accomplice, and the his acts is called for in this section, not corn-
sentences meted out in other first-degree mur- parison with other criminals and their crimes, 
der cases. State v. Tillman, 760 P.2d 546 (Utah State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273 (Utah 1989), 
1987), cert, denied, Tillman v. Cook, U.S. cert denied, 469 U.S. 988,110 S. Ct. 1837,108 
, 114 S. Ct 706,126 U Ed. 2d 671 (1994). L. Ed. 2d 965 (1990). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. JUT. 3d.—21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law C.J.8. —- 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law ft 25. 
ftft 9,18. Key Numbers. — Criminal Law *» 13. 
76-1-105. Common law crimes abolished. 
Common law crimes are abolished and no conduct is a crime unless made so 
by this code, other applicable statute or ordinance. 
History: C. 1953, 76-1-106, enacted by L. 
1973, eh. 196,1 76-1-106; 1974, eh. 32,1 1. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS punishment and clearly covering the conduct 
~ t _ x v . i i v~i °&*n City v. McLaughlin, 5 Utah 387, 16 P. 
Common law crimes abolished. 721 f 1888) 
N e » » i * for .tatuto or ordin.DC.
 g i n o e ^ j , , ctimtB ^ a b o | W ) e d 
and court could not impose penalties unless the 
Common law crimes abolished. penalties were authorized by statute or ordi-
The Criminal Code explicitly abolishes all nance, statute or ordinance that failed to attach 
common law crimes. State v. Maestas, 662 P.2d penalty to crime or offenses was inoperative. 
903 (Utah 1982). Roe v. Lundstrom, 89 Utah 620, 67 P.2d 1128 (1936). 
Necessity for statute or ordinance. 
Conduct, no matter how reprehensible, was Cited in State v. Gardiner, 814 E2d 668 
not punishable in absence of a law authorizing (Utah 1991). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d.—21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law C.J.S. — 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 24. 
ft 7. Key Numbers. — Criminal Law «» 11. 
76-1 -106. Strict construction rule not applicable. 
The rule that a penal statute is to be strictly construed shall not apply to this 
code, any of its provisions, or any offense defined by the laws of this state. All 
provisions of this code and offenses defined by the laws of this state shall be 
construed according to the fair import of their terms to promote justice and to 
effect the objects of the law and general purposes of Section 76-1-104. 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 76-1-1U / 
History: C. 1953, 76-1-106, enacted by L. ftft 68-2-8, 68-2-9, 68-3-6. 
1973, ch. 196,ft 76-1-106. Statutes in derogation of the common law not 
Cross-References. — Effect of repeal on strictly construed, ft 68-3-2. 
prosecution of offenses already committed, 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS Lewis, 62 Utah 7,172 P. 286 (1918). 
City ordinances. Extension of time. 
Extension of time. Notwithstanding statute providing that 
Cited. criminal statutes were not to be strictly con-
r»t*- _*II strued, it was beyond court's power to extend 
City ordinances. statutory time for filing motion for new trial. 
Statute providing that criminal statutes
 S t a t e v S a w y € r 54 U t a h 75 1 8 2 p. 206 (1919). 
were not to be strictly construed applied to city 
ordinances, and ordinance prohibiting sale of Cited in State v. Jones, 735 P.2d 399 (Utah 
intoxicating liquors was given liberal construe- Ct. App. 1987); State v. Jaimez, 817 P.2d 822 
tion so as to uphold its validity. Salina City v. (Utah Ct App. 1991). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law GJJ9. — 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law ft 26. 
ftft 10,18. Key Numbers. — Criminal Law •» 12. 
76-1-107. Procedure — Applicable provisions — Military 
codes, enforcement of court orders, and liability 
for civil damages not affected. 
(1) Except 08 otherwise provided, the procedure governing the accusatioi 
prosecution, conviction, and punishment of offenders and offenses is n< 
regulated by this act but by the code of criminal procedure. 
(2) This code does not affect any power conferred by law upon any cour 
martial or other military authority or officer to impose and inflict punishmei 
upon offenders violating military codes or laws; nor does it affect any power 
a court to punish for contempt or to employ any sanction authorized by law f 
the enforcement of an order or a civil judgment or decree. 
(3) This act does not bar, suspend, or otherwise affect any right or liabili 
to damages, penalty, forfeiture, impeachment, or other remedy authorized 
law to be recovered or enforced in a civil action, administrative proceeding, 
otherwise, regardless of whether the conduct involved in the proceedi 
constitutes an offense defined in this code. 
I 
History: C. 1953, 76-1-107, enacted by L. Contempt generally, ft 78-32-1 et seq. 
1973, ch. 196, ft 76-1-107. Criminal procedure, Title 77. 
Cross-References. — Civil and criminal Military court, ft 39-6-16. 
remedies do not merge, ft 68-3-4. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Contempt proceeding. nature of a civil proceeding and one in 
Former Penal Code provision similar to Sub- nature of a criminal proceeding. Forema 
section (2) of this section expressed no distinc- Foreman, 111 Utah 113,176 P.2d 165 (194 
tion between a contempt proceeding in the 
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76-6-302 CRIMINAL CODE 
who accosted the victim with a knife and club 
and demanded to know where she kept her 
silver and gold. State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d 691 
(Utah 1988). 
Erroneous admission of defendant's prior 
convictions of retail theft and attempted bur-
glary was harmless, where the state presented 
sufficient evidence and eyewitness testimony to 
prove that defendant committed the robbery. 
State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646 (1989). 
Evidence, upon which the jury could reason-
ably find that the defendant solicited, re-
quested, commanded, encouraged, or intention-
ally aided another person in the aggravated 
robbery of a jewelry store with the requisite 
intent, was sufficient to support the defendant's 
conviction of aggravated robbery. State v. Webb, 
790 P.2d 65 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
There was sufficient evidence for the jury 
reasonably to find that the defendant commit-
ted the crime of aggravated robbery, where two 
witnesses positively identified the defendant as 
the robber, and a hat and a coat found inside 
the stolen car used in the robbery matched the 
witnesses' description of the clothing worn by 
the robber. State v. Humphrey, 793 P.2d 918 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Evidence was sufficient to support conviction 
of robbery notwithstanding one eyewitness's 
initial identification of another person as rob-
ber. See State v. Hayes, 860 P.2d 968 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1993). 
Eyewitness identification. 
Although the only evidence convicting defen-
dant of aggravated robbery was the eyewitness 
identification of the victim, it was not prejudi-
cial error for the trial court to refuse to instruct 
the jury as to the special pitfalls of eyewitness 
identification. State v. Newton, 681 P.2d 833 
(Utah 1984). 
Included offense. 
Grand larceny conviction was improper when 
accompanied by conviction of robbery (with 
pistol) for same conduct since grand larceny 
was included offense in robbery charge. State v. 
Montayne, 18 Utah 2d 38, 414 P. 2d 958, cert, 
denied, 385 U.S. 939,87 S. Ct. 305,17 L. Ed. 2d 
218 (1966). 
Under the test for separateness found in 
Subsection 76-1-402(3), aggravated robbery be-
comes a lesser included offense of first degree 
felony murder when the predicate felony for 
first degree murder is aggravated robbery. 
State v. Shaffer, 725 P.2d 1301 (Utah 1986). 
Aggravated robbery is one of the predicate 
offenses of felony murder. State v. McCovey, 803 
P.2d 1234 (Utah 1990). 
Indictment or information. 
Information for robbery (with firearm appar-
ently in pocket of robber) that used the word 
"robbed" sufficiently informed accused of nature 
and cause of accusation, at least in absence of 
demand for bill of particulars; there was but 
one crime of robbery, and words such as "by 
means offeree or fear" were unnecessary. State 
v. Bobbins, 102 Utah 119, 127 P2d 1042 (1942). 
In prosecution for robbery (by force of arms), 
variance between complaint filed in city court 
and information filed in district court as to 
ownership of property taken was not fatal 
where both alleged that defendant took prop-
erty from possession or presence of same per-
son. State v. Perry, 27 Utah 2d 48, 492 P.2d 
1349 (1972). 
Intent. 
Intent to commit crime of robbery (using 
firearms) or assault with intent to commit mur-
der could be found from proof of facts from 
which it reasonably could have been believed 
that such was intent of defendant, because 
additional facts may be inferred from those 
shown directly by evidence. State v. Kazda, 15 
Utah 2d 313, 392 P.2d 486 (1964). 
Recent possession of stolen property. 
Statute making unexplained recent posses-
sion of stolen property prima facie evidence of 
larceny applied to offense of robbery when 
larceny and robbery were committed in same 
transaction. State v. Donovan, 77 Utah 343,294 
P. 1108 (1931). 
Recovery of property by force. 
Defendant, even if he took money from an-
other by force or fear, was not guilty of robbery 
(with revolver), regardless of whatever other 
offense he might have committed in taking of 
money, if money actually belonged to him, and 
its possession by person from whom it was 
taken was wrongful since, in such case, animus 
furandi element of robbery was lacking. People 
v. Hughes, 11 Utah 100, 39 P. 492 (1895). 
Sentence. 
—Use of a firearm. 
The legislature's 1975 amendment of the 
aggravated robbery statute to specify use of a 
firearm, coupled with the subsequent enact-
ment of the general sentence enhancement pro-
visions, created no ambiguity over what pen-
alty the legislature intended for robbery 
committed with a firearm. The legislature was 
merely increasing the degree of a robbery com-
mitted with the enumerated instruments of 
violence. State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990). 
Threatening to use weapon. 
Threatening to use a dangerous weapon dur-
ing the commission of a robbery, regardless of 
whether one actually possesses such a weapon, 
is sufficient for a charge of aggravated robbery 
under this section. State v. Adams, 830 P.2d 310 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
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Unloaded firearm. 1986); State v. Iacono, 725 P.2d 1375 (Utah 
Aggravated robbery may be committed with 1986); State v. Griffiths, 752 P.2d 879 (Utah 
an unloaded firearm. State v. Turner, 572 P.2d 1988); State v. Whittle, 780 P2d 819 (1989); 
387 (Utah 1977). State v. Russell, 791 P.2d 188 (Utah 1990); 
™* J • a* * r w « o o o j o i o m » u State v. Severance, 828 P,2d 1066 (Utah Ct. 
• J S ? ^ ^ n W ^ P M III m^K App. 1992); State v. Lee, 831 P.2d 114 (Utah Ct. 
1985); State v. DeJesus, 712 P.2d 246 (Utah
 A** 1QQ9Y 
1985); State v. Gutierrez, 714 P.2d 295 (Utah A p p* ™*Z)' 
1986); State v. Bishop, 717 P.2d 261 (Utah 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 67 Am. Jur. 2d Robbery § 3. Admissibility of expert opinion stating 
C.J.S. — 77 C.J.S. Robbery $ 27. whether a particular knife was, or could have 
AX.R. — Fact that gun was unloaded as been, the weapon used in a crime, 83 A.L.R.4th 
affecting criminal responsibility, 68 A.L.R.4ih 660. 
507. Key Numbers. — Robbery •» 11. 
PART 4 
THEFT 
76-6-401. Definitions. 
For the purposes of this part: 
(1) "Property" means anything of value, including real estate, tangible 
and intangible personal property, captured or domestic animals and birds, 
written instruments or other writings representing or embodying rights 
concerning real or personal property, labor, services, or otherwise contain-
ing anything of value to the owner, commodities of a public utility nature 
such as telecommunications, gas, electricity, steam, or water, and trade 
secrets, meaning the whole or any portion of any scientific or technical 
information, design, process, procedure, formula or invention which the 
owner thereof intends to be available only to persons selected by him. 
(2) "Obtain" means, in relation to property, to bring about a transfer of 
possession or of some other legally recognized interest in property, 
whether to the obtainer or another; in relation to labor or services, to 
secure performance thereof; and in relation to a trade secret, to make any 
facsimile, replica, photograph, or other reproduction. 
(3) "Purpose to deprive" means to have the conscious object: 
(a) lb withhold property permanently or for so extended a period or 
to use under such circumstances that a substantial portion of its 
economic value, or of the use and benefit thereof, would be lost; or 
(b) To restore £he property only upon payment of a reward or other 
compensation; or 
(c) lb dispose of the property under circumstances that make it 
unlikely that the owner will recover it. 
(4) "Obtain or exercise unauthorized control" means, but is not neces-
sarily limited to, conduct heretofore defined or known as common-law 
larceny by trespassory taking, larceny by conversion, larceny by bailee, 
and embezzlement. 
(5) "Deception" occurs when a person intentionally: 
(a) Creates or confirms by words or conduct an impression of law or 
fact that is false and that the actor does not believe to be true and that 
is likely to affect the judgment of another in the transaction; or 
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76-6-511. Defrauding creditors. 
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if: 
(1) He destroys, removes, conceals, encumbers, transfers, or otherwise 
deals with property subject to a security interest with a purpose to hinder 
enforcement of that interest; or 
(2) Knowing that proceedings have been or are about to be instituted 
for the appointment of a person entitled to administer property for the 
benefit of creditors, he: 
(a) Destroys, removes, conceals, encumbers, transfers, or otherwise 
deals with any property with a purpose to defeat or obstruct the claim 
of any creditor, or otherwise to obstruct the operation of any law 
relating to administration of property for the benefit of creditors; or 
(b) Presents to any creditor or to an assignee for the benefit of 
creditors, orally or in writing, any statement relating to the debtor's 
estate, knowing that a material part of such statement is false. 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-511, enacted by L. Cross-References. — Conveyance to hinder 
1973, ch. 196, ft 76-6-511. or defraud, §§ 25-6-1 et seq., 70A-2-402. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 37 Am. Jur. 2d Fraudulent proper sale, removal, concealment, or disposal 
Conveyances § 2. of property subject to security interest under 
C.J.S. — 37 CJ.S. Fraudulent Conveyances UCC, 48 A.L.R.4th 819. 
5 4 69- Key Numbers. — Fraudulent Conveyances 
A.L.R. — Elements and proof of crime of im- *» 329. 
76-6-512. Acceptance of deposit by insolvent financial in-
stitution. 
A person is guilty of a felony of the third degree if: 
(1) As an officer, manager, or other person participating in the direc-
tion of a financial institution, as defined in Section 76-6-411, he receives 
or permits receipt of a deposit or other investment knowing that the 
institution is or is about to become unable, from any cause, to pay its 
obligations in the ordinary course of business; and 
(2) He knows that the person making the payment to the institution is 
unaware of such present or prospective inability. 
History: C. 1963, 76-6-512, enacted by L. Compiler's Notes. — Section 76-6-411, 
1973, ch. 196, ft 76-6-612. cited in Subsection (1), was repealed in 1974. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 10 Am. Jur. 2d Banks Key Numbers. — Banks and Banking •» 
* 242. 82(2), 83, 84. 
C.J.S. — 9 CJ.S. Banks and Banking § 156. 
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76-6-513. Unlawful dealing with property by fiduciary. 
(1) A person is guilty of theft, punishable under Section 76-6-412, if he 
deals with property that has been entrusted to him as a fiduciary, or property 
of the government or of a financial institution, in a manner which he knows is 
a violation of his duty and which involves substantial risk of loss to the owner 
or to a person for whose benefit the property was entrusted. 
(2) As used in this section "fiduciary" includes any person carrying on fidu-
ciary functions on behalf of a corporation or other organization which is a 
fiduciary. "Government" and "financial institution" have the meanings given 
in Section 76-6-411; "property" has the meaning given in Section 76-6-401(1). 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-513, enacted by L. ferred to in Subsection (2), was repealed in 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-513; 1983, ch. 91, ft 1. 1974. 
Compiler's Notes. — Section 76-6-411, re-
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Note, Utah's Statute bility: A Guide for Lawyers and Directors, 
Permitting Limits on Corporate Directors' Lia- 1988 Utah L. Rev. 847. 
76-6-514. Bribery or threat to influence contest. 
A person is guilty of a felony of the third degree if: 
(1) With a purpose to influence any participant or prospective partici-
pant not to give his best efforts in a publicly exhibited contest, he confers 
or offers or agrees to confer any benefit upon or threatens any injury to a 
participant or prospective participant; or 
(2) With a purpose to influence an official in a publicly exhibited con-
test to perform his duties improperly, he confers or offers or agrees to 
confer any benefit upon or threatens any injury to such official; or 
(3) With a purpose to influence the outcome of a publicly exhibited 
contest, he tampers with any person, animal, or thing contrary to the 
rules and usages purporting to govern the contest; or 
(4) He knowingly solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept any benefit, the 
giving of which would be criminal under [Subsection] (1) or (2). 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-514, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, ft 76-6-514. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 12 Am. Jur. 2d Bribery C.J.S. — 11 CJ.S. Bribery ft 2. 
S 16. Key Numbers. — Bribery «» 2. 
76-6-515. Using or making slugs. 
(1) A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if: 
(a) With a purpose to defraud the supplier of property or a service 
offered or sold by means of a coin machine, he inserts, deposits, or uses a 
slug in that machine; or 
(b) He makes, possesses, or disposes of a slug with the purpose of en-
abling a person to use it fraudulently in a coin machine. 
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% Basement Finished 2 .% Basement Sq Ft Finished. 
HddiiJ 
Salesman " 7 ^ / f £ooti>/1/4iY 
LS No Phone 
I No 
Fee Paid to Selling Office £ t y £ 6 
DReiisted Contract Previous &LS I 
Mssm 
(New Construction) Builder 
Type of Insulation Walls 
Thickness Walls 
R Value Walls 
E23E 
(Percent of gross sales price or flat fee) 
First list date 
m Ceiling. 
. Ceiling. 
. Ceiling. 
. Floor. 
. Floor. 
Floor 
POSSESSION (Poss) 
1 A) Immediate (Now) 
2 0 30 Days (30) 
3 O Call Listing Office/Nego (C-LO) 
4 O Upon Closing (UpCIs) 
OCCUPANCY (Occ) 
1 O Owner (Own) 
2 O Renter (Rent) 
3 X Vacant (Vent) 
4 O Management Co (MgmtCo) 
APPOINTMENT (App) 
1 O Call Owner (C-Own) 
2X?a ( l L B t l f >9o t t , C €(C L O) 
3 0 t a l l Occupant (C-Occ) 
4 O Key at Listing Office (KLO) 
5 O Use Keybox (KB) 
6 O No Appt Necessary (NAN) 
7 O Management Co (MgmtCo) 
ASSESSMENTS (Asses) 
1 & Paid (AsPd) 
2{>NotPatd(AsNtPd) 
ASSUME EXISTING LOAN (AEL) 
~> Yes at current rate (YCR) 
) Yes with Int Increase (Yll) 
) Yes with discount (YD) 
) Yes buyer to qualify (YBkQ) 
^No(N) 
f Call Listing Agent (LA) 
TERMS OF SALE )Terms) 
1 DVA(VA) 
2 fcFHA(FHA) 
3 b Conventional (Conv) 
4 b Assume (Asm) 
5 b Contract (Ctr) 
6 p Trust Deed (STD) 
7 p Exchange (Ex) 
8 D Lease/fimeshare 
rtMENT INCLUDES (Inct) 
1 i>Tax(T) 
2 j) Insurance (I) 
STYLE (Style) 
1 ) Ranch (Rnch) 
2 ) Split Level (SplLvl) 
3 ) Split Entry (SplEnt) 
4 } Rambler tRamb) 
S'jd Cottage (Cttg) 
6 3 Bungalow (Bngl) 
7 ) Two Story (2Str) 
8 ) Three Story (3Str) 
9 ) Contemporary (Cntmp) 
10 ) Towne House (TwHs) 
11 ) Plnd Unt Dvfpmnt (PUD) 
12 ) Twin Home (Twin) 
CONSTRUCTION (Const) 
1 ^6 Frame (Frm) 
2 «3 Stucco (Stuc) 
3 1) Bnck (Brk) 
4 ) Masonite (Mas) 
5 ) Cedar (Ced) 
6 ) Rock (Rock) 
7 ) Aluminum (Alum) 
8 ) Cinder Block (CndBlk) 
9 ) Shingle (Shing) 
10O Asbestos (Asb) 
11 ) Log (Log) 
12 ) Concrete (Con) 
13 ) Steel Siding (Steel) 
14 ) Vinyl Siding (Vin) 
UTILITIES (Util) 
1 « Culinary Wtr-City (CWC) 
2'^Culinary Wtr Well (CWW) 
3 t) Culinary Wtr-Other (CWO) 
4/fSewer(Swr) 
5 ) Septic Tank (Sptc) 
6 ) Natural Gas (NtGas) 
7 XJ Electricity (Elec) 
8 ) Secondary Water (Sec Wtr) 
9 X , r n 9 a t , o n (,rr) 
1(7? Irrigation Wen (IrrW) 
CARPORT CRPT) 
1 ) lCar( lCar) 
2 )2Car(2Car) 
3 )3Car(3Car) 
4 > Attached (Att) 
5 ) Detached (Det) 
6 ) Built m Basement (BIB 
7 N* None 
GARAGE (GAR) 
1 ) lCar( lCar) 
2 )2Car(2Car) 
3 )3Car(3Car) 
4 > Attached (Att) 
5 ) Detached (Det) 
6 ) Built in Basement (BIB 
7£None(N) 
8 ) Door Opener (0) 
ROOF 
1 J Asbestos (Abs) 
2 X Asphalt (Asph) 
3 ) Bartile (Bar) 
4 ) Shingle (Shing) 
5 ) Tar & Gravel (TrGr) 
6 ) Aluminum (Alum) 
7 ) Shakes (Shk) 
8 ) Metal (Met) 
9 ) Wood (Wood) 
BUILT-INS(Bltln) 
1 ) Oven/Range (OR) 
2 ) Microwave (MW) 
3 > Refrigerator 
4 ) Central Vacuum (CV) 
5 ) Intercom (IN) 
6 ) Dishwasher (DW) 
7 ) Garbage Disposal (D) 
8 ) Trash Compactor (TC) 
EXTRAS INSIDE (Exlin) 
1 ) Entry (Ent) 
2 ) Coal or Wood Heater (CWH) 
3 )AirCond Electric (ACE) 
4 )AirCond-Gas(ACG) 
5 )AirCond Evaporative (ACV) 
6 )GasFAHeat(GFAH) 
7 ) Electric Heat (EH) 
8 ) Hot Water Heat (HWH) 
9 J Space Heater (SPWL^j™ 
10>tf Oil Heat (OilH) C Citf*.* 
11 ) Propane Heal (PrpH) 
12 ; Water Heater Gas (WHG) 
M Water Heater Electric (WHE) 
14 ) Water Heater Solar (WHS) 
15J£ Window Covenno (WC) 
16^> Floor Covering (FC) 
17 ) Wtr Softener Owned (WSO) 
18 ) Wtr Softener Rented (WSR) 
19 ) Solar Heat (Solar) 
20 ) Security System (SEC) 
21 ) Heal Pump (HP) 
€XTRAS OUTSIDE (ExtOut) 
1 ) Patio (Pto) 
2 ) Patio Covered (PtoCov) 
3 )Deck(Dck) 
4 ) Deck Covered (DkCov) 
5 ^ Fenced Full (FndF) 
6 ^ Fenced Pari (FndP) 
Tjfl Curb and Gutter (C G) 
$5f> Sidewalk (Sdwk) 
9 !) Spr*klmg Sys Full (SpkFl) 
10 ) SprWmc Sys Part (SpkPt) 
11 ) Landsca x* Full (LndFI) 
12>^ Landscaped Part (LndPt) 
13 5 Storm Doors (StrDr) 
14 ) Storm Windows (StrWn) 
15 ) Double Pane Windows 
16 ) Triple Pane Windows 
17 ) Thermo Windows (ThrmWn) 
18 ) Storage Sheds (StrSh) 
19 ) Bams (Bm) 
20 ) Corrals (Crrt) 
21 ) Gas BBQ (BBQ) 
22 ) TV Antenna (TVAnt) 
23 ) RV Parking (RV) 
24 ) Auto bprmkler (AutoSpk; 
i d A -KASZ/QEftT. J>££P LOT , //?/?_ {6-*T/Cy * J t / £ - £ 
SALES AGENCY CONTRACT 
In consideration of your agreement to list the property described herein and to use 
reasonable efforts to find a purchaser or tenant therefor I hereby grant you for the period 
stated herein from date hereof the exclusive nght to sell lease or exchange said property 
or any part thereof at the price and terms stated herein, or at such other price or terms to 
which I may agree in writing 
During the life of this contract, if you your agent, or any other party finds a party who is 
ready able and willing to buy lease or exchange said property or any part thereof at said 
price and terms or any other pnee or terms to which I may agree in writing or if said 
property or any part thereof is sold leased or exchanged dunno sa^ term by myself or any 
other party I agree to pay the broker listed below a fee of fc» 7A)f said sale lease or 
exchange price Unless otherwise agreed in wnting the fee shall be due and payable on 
the date of closing the sale lease or exchange Such fee shall be paid if property is sold, 
conveyed or otherwise transferred wtthtnyCTdays after the termnabon of this contract, or 
•ny extension thereof to any party to wnom the property was offered or shown by me or 
you or any other party during the term of this listing^ However, I shall not be obligated to 
pay such fee if a valid listing agreement is entered into dunng the term of said protection 
penod with another licensed real estate broker and a sale, lease or exchange of the 
properly is made dunng the term of said protection period 
You are hereby authorized to accept a deposit as earnest money from any potential 
buyer on the above described property Said deposit is to be held in trust account 
I hereby warrant the information herein to be correct and that I have marketable title or 
an otherwise established nght to sell lease or exchange said property, except as stated I 
agree to execute the necessary documentsof conveyance or lease and to prorate general 
7V7 „ . u « , / f > / / i / **$*> This contract is entered into this fe> day of (JCS£-)S 
Salesman Signature^ 
. 19_ 
Owner I hereby acknowledge receipt of this agreement. 
Member of Multiple Listing Service Board of REALTORS^ 
taxes insurance rents interest and other expenses affecting said property to agreed date 
of possession and to furnish a good and marketable title with abstract to date or at my 
option a policy of title insurance in the amount of the purchase price and in the name of the 
purchaser In the event of sale or lease of other than real property I agree to provide 
proper conveyance and acceptable evidence of title or right to sell lease or exchange 
In case of the employment of an attorney to enforce any of the terms of this agreement I 
agree to pay a reasonable attorney s fee and all costs of collection 
You are hereby authorized to obtain financial information from any mortgagee or other 
party holding a lien or interest on this property You are hereby authorized and instructed to 
offer this property through the Multiple Listing Service of the Board of REALTORS" to 
which you belong 
You are hereby authorized to place an appropriate sign on said property 
You are hereby authorized and instructed to have a key box installed on my property as 
described above As owner I accept the full responsibility for any loss or damage that 
might result from the use of the key box from any source whatsoever and agree to hold you 
and the Board of REALTORS« to which you belong and its Multiple Listing Service harm 
less from any and all liability as a result of having the key box installed on my property 
The fees payable for the sale lease or management of property are not set by any Board 
of REALTORS* or Multiple Listing Service or in any manner o'ber than between the 
broker and the client 
The parties hereto agree not to discriminate against any person or persons based on 
race color religion sex or national origin in connection with the sale lease or exchange of 
properties under this agreement
 m *nj 
1_ This contract expireakprVthe ^ 1 ^-day of 
Owner Signature > ^ C T V ^ S J ^ N A ^ - Q ^ V S Q A v\ V f\_ 
Owner S i g n a t u > e ^ y [ ^ ^ L ^ X ^ y Jr^ftl/Jf/^S 
Owner Address 
This is a legally binding loan 11 not understood, seek competent legal advice Approved Form Board of REALTORS*1 
ADDENDUM C 
TRANSCRIPT OF FLOOR DEBATE 
HB 281: 25 HER 1983 
45 Leg., Day 47, Record No.6, Side 1, Counter No. 16. 
CLERK: House BUI 281: Penalty for Intentional Breach of Fiduciary Duty by 
Representative Nolan E. Karros, being enacted by the Legislature of the State of 
Utah. 
KARRAS: Thank you, Mr. Speaker. Representatives, the bill you have before you, House 
Bill 281, was brought to me by the Statewide Area Prosecutors. It is a bill that 
changes the penalty for a fiduciary's breach of his duty in protecting property, 
mainly cash funds that are with him, or held by him in trust. The problem was 
highlighted by some people, some attorneys, that were in Utah County,-in two 
different instances, as I understand it, used the monies that were held in their 
trust account, their client's monies-misappropriated the money and the highest 
penalty they could be charged under the current law was a misdemeanor. The 
prosecutors felt some frustration at that because the Bar Association wouldn't take 
action against these folks unless it was a felony. What it amounts to is if you 
went into Cheryl Fidel's house and stole $2,000 you'd be guilty of a felony, but 
if he gave ya $2,000 in a trust account and you stole that, you would only be 
guilty of a misdemeanor. Were just trying to make some similarities really in 
saying that if someone does misappropriate funds as a fiduciary, someone that has 
responsibility for someone else's money, that the punishment is increased. And 
Mr. Speaker I'd like to divert some time to Representative Hillyard for, to help 
me with the explanation. 
HILLYARD-. The Code outlines some, initially referred to in the act, is a classification of 
offenses under theft. And if you steal property or services exceeding $1,000, or 
a firearm or an operable motor car, or if you are armed with a deadly weapon at 
the time of the theft, or the property is stolen from the person of another, its a 
felony of the second degree which has a minimum of five years in prison. A 
felony of the third degree if the value of services is more than $250 or less than 
$1,000 and if the actor has been twice before convicted of theft of property or 
services valued at $250 or less. It talks about some animals. I think the real 
thing this bill does is bring theft of a, by a fiduciary into the same classifications 
of theft as it would be by anyone else. I would be glad to respond to any 
questions you may have in that area, but I think it just makes it consistent 
throughout the Code. 
Is there further discussion? Representative Karras you may sum up, 
Thank you, I'll waive sum-up. 
Voting is open, [pause] Appears to the chair that all present have voted, voting 
is closed on House Bill 281 having received 59 affirmative an no negative votes 
it passes this house. Referred to the Senate for their consideration. 
SPEAKER: 
KARRAS: 
SPEAKER: 
ADDENDUM D 
§ 2 2 4 . 1 3 OFFENSES AGAINST PROPERTY Art. 224 
§ 2 2 4 . 1 3 Misapplication of Entrusted Property and Prop-
erty of Government or Financial Institution * 
A person commits an offense if he applies or disposes of prop-
erty that has been entrusted to him as a fiduciary, or property 
of the government or of a financial institution, in a manner which 
he knows is unlawful and involves substantia] risk of loss or detri-
ment to the owner of the property or to a person for whose bene-
fit the property was entrusted. The offense is a misdemeanor if 
the amount involved exceeds $50; otherwise it is a petty misde-
meanor. "Fiduciary" includes trustee, guardian, executor, admin-
istrator, receiver and any person carrying on fiduciary functions 
on behalf of a corporation or other organization which is a fi-
duciary. 
Comment f 
1. Background. This section covers the mishandling of prop-
erty restricted by law to particular uses, such as property held 
in trust or public funds appropriated for designated purposes. 
The essence of the offense is a knowing violation of the restric-
tions or regulations governing the handling of property. No 
purpose to appropriate the property for the benefit of the actor 
or another nor any purpose to deprive the owners or lawful bene-
ficiaries of their property need be proved. The absence of 
such purposes is what distinguishes this offense from embezzle-
ment and larceny, forms of theft that are treated in the con-
solidated theft provisions in Section 223.2 of the Model Code. 
Under Section 224.13, the actor may still be liable even though 
he intends to use the property more effectively for the beneficial 
owners, as where a trustee endeavors to increase the income 
from a trust by investing the trust funds in high-yield specula-
tive securities rather than in low-yield government bonds as re-
• History Presented to the Institute as Section 206 40 of Tentative Draft 
No 2 and considered at the May 1954 meeting. See generally ALI Proceed 
ings 146-52 (1954) Reprinted in Tentative Draft No 4 Presented again 
to the Institute in the Proposed Official Draft and approved at the May 
1962 meeting. See ALI Proceedings 226-27 (1962). Detailed commentary 
was originally included in Tentative Draft No. 2 at 124-25 (1954) 
t Except where otherwise noted, the abbreviated citation of statutes refers 
to enactments prior to November 1, 1978 However, the subsequently enact-
ed New Jersey statute has been included throughout As used in an abbre-
viated citation, the symbol (p) refers to a proposed code for the indicated 
jurisdiction A full explanation of all abbreviated citations appears at p XXXIX" 
supra 
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quired by the deed of trust or where an army disbursing officer 
diverts funds allocated for a base swimming pool to build tennis 
courts instead 
Such behavior was often treated as equivalent to embezzle-
ment in laws in effect when Section 224.13 was drafted.1 It is 
clear, however, that conduct of this sort is criminologicaHy dis-
tinct from fraudulent misappropriation of the funds of another. 
The conduct covered here does not grow out of acquisitiveness, 
with a corresponding need to increase penalties to felony levels 
in proportion to the temptation to large gains. Instead, this 
provision covers failure to observe carefully regulations designed 
to safeguard property. Accordingly, it is at least appropriate to 
reduce the level of the offense to a misdemeanor or petty misde-
meanor, and a case could be made for its elimination from the 
penal code entirely, relying instead on civil sanctions to keep fi-
duciaries from diverting funds to uses beyond their authority.8 
A good case could be made as well to remove this provision 
from an article dealing with various forms of fraud, in view of 
the absence of fraudulent purpose that will characterize the situ-
ations to which it will apply. Properly viewed, the offense in-
1
 E g., Mo 5 558 260 (repealed 1979) (officials who appropriate or disburse 
funds for an unauthorized purpose are guilty of a felony), N M $ 41-4519 
(repealed 1963) (any person in possession of another's property who disposes 
of it "in any way not authorized by the owner" is guilty of embezzlement); 
18 U S C §§ 641 (10 years* imprisonment for theft or disposing of govern-
ment property "without authority*), 644 ("whoever applies any 
portion of public money for any purpose not prescribed by law is guilty of 
embezzlement"), 646 (any clerk or officer of the court who "fails to deposit 
promptly any money belonging in registry of the court" is guilty of embez-
zlement). But c/ Pa tit 18, § 4832 (repealed 1973) (use of tax money for 
purpose other than that for which it was collected is a misdemeanor). For 
relevant case law, see Golden v United States, 318 F2d 357 (1st Cir. 1963) 
(conviction for misapplication of bank funds does not depend on whether 
bank profits or loses from the unauthorized transaction), Dimmick v. United 
States, 121 F 638 (9th Cir), cert denied, 191 US 574 (1903) (convic-
tion of etnbezzlement for failure to deposit funds on date required by regula-
tion). 
2
 The Brown Commission recommended the modification of federal law 
along the lines suggested by this section and in explicit reliance on the Mod-
el Penal Code Brown Comm'n, Final Report 5 1737, 2 Brown Comm'n, Work-
ing Papers 930-32 The proposed federal code as passed by the Senate omit-
ted such an offense, presumably leaving the matter to theft statutes and reg-
ulatory offenses US (p) S 1437, §5 1713 to 1738 (1978) A few states have 
included a comparable offense under general theft statutes Ariz 9 13-
1802(a)(2); Iowa § 714 1(2), S D § 22-30A-10. 
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volves the safeguarding of property and thus could with reason 
be placed in Article 220 along with criminal mischief. 
2. Elements of the Offense. Section 224.13 makes it a crimi-
nal offense for a person to apply or dispose of entrusted proper-
ty in a manner that he knows is unlawful and that he knows 
to involve substantial risk of loss to the beneficial owner of the 
property. Entrusted property is described as property entrusted 
to the actor as a "fiduciary" as well as property of the govern-
ment or a financial institution. The term "fiduciary" is broadly 
defined in the final sentence of the section. The term "financial 
institution" is defined in Section 223.0(2), and the definition is 
made applicable to Article 224 offenses by Section 224.0. There 
are two issues related to the scope of the section that deserve 
separate treatment. 
(a) Limitation of Class of Offenders. One problem is 
how far to extend the criminal law in dealing with non-
fraudulent misapplication of property. It seems inadvisable 
to make a criminal offense out of every breach of instruc-
tions by a bailee or agent with respect to the disposition of 
property in his custody. Accordingly, the principle has 
been adopted, derived from a variety of laws existing when 
Section 224.13 was drafted, of penalizing non-fraudulent 
misapplication only in situations where the obligation of 
close adherence to the limits of authority is well defined and 
generally recognized, as in the case of fiduciaries and in re-
spect of property of the government or a financial 
institution.3 In these areas people generally are aware of 
strict limits on the discretion of individuals to deal with 
property in their control and usually will know that de-
viation from the rules may have substantial consequences. 
There are, nevertheless, recently enacted provisions that 
extend the coverage of related provisions beyond such a 
narrow class of persons. The New York statute, for exam-
ple, creates a general offense of misapplication of property 
in the case of any person "knowingly possessing personal 
3
 In addition to the references in note 1 supra, see 18 U.S.C. §§656 (bank-
er or employee who embezzles or "wilfully misapplies"). 660 (manager or 
employee of common carrier who steals or "wilfully misapplies"). See also 
Mass. ch. 266, § 53A (banker or employee who "wilfully misapplies"; "with-
out authority" issues a certificate of deposit or bill of exchange; "without 
authority" assigns any note or other property of the bank; knowingly ac-
cepts inadequate security or an "irresponsible" endorsement); Pa. tit. 18, § 
4829 (repealed 1973) (wilful misapplication of bank property "with intent 
. to injure or defraud"). 
360 
Art. 224 MISAPPLICATION PROPERTY § 224.13 
property of another pursuant to an agreement that the 
same will be returned to the owner at a future time*' who 
"loans, pledges, pawns or otherwise encumbers such proper-
ty" without consent and in such a manner as "to create a 
risk that the owner will not be able to recover it or will suf-
fer pecuniary loss." 4 The offense is much narrower than 
Section 224.13 in the sense that the covered conduct does 
not reach some situations where the actor "applies or dis-
poses of property" in a manner inconsistent with lawful re-
strictions. It does, however, apply to ordinary bailees and 
to that extent departs substantially from the recommenda-
tions of the Model Code. The majority of recently drafted 
codes and proposals have followed the Model Penal Code 
formulation for the class of persons covered by this offense.5 
Delaware and Connecticut have followed the more expan-
sive definition in New York.* 
(b) Culpability. Even as restricted to a narrow class of 
persons, Section 224.13 does not permit criminal punishment 
for every breach of property rules. It requires first that 
the actor's conduct be unlawful and that it expose the prop-
erty to a substantial risk of loss or detriment. The section 
further requires that the actor know of the unlawfulness of 
his conduct7 and that he know of the substantial risk of 
loss or detriment to the beneficial owrpr of the property.11 
4N.Y. § 165.00(1). Subsection (2) provides a defense if at the time the 
prosecution is begun the defendant has recovered the property and no mate-
rial economic loss has resulted. 
»E. g., Ala. 5 13A-9-51; Haw. 5 708-S74; Ind. 5 33-43-5-3(4); Ky. § 517.-
110; Me. tit. 17A, 5 903; N.H. § 638:11; N.D. § 12.1-23-07; Ore. § 165.095; 
Pa. tit. 18, 5 4113; Tex. § 32.45; Utah 5 76-&-513; Mich, (p) § 4155; S.C. 
(p) § 19.11; Vt. (p) § 2.22.3; W.Va. (p) § 61-8-29. See also Brown Comm'n, 
Final Report 5 1737; 2 Brown Comm'n, Working Papers 931. 
The recent enactment in New Jersey follows the substance of the Model 
Code provision exactly, except for the addition of the words "whether or not 
the actor has derived a pecuniary benefit" at the end of the first sentence of 
Section 224.13. N.J.'§ 2C21-15. The thought expressed by the addition of 
such language is implicit in the Model Code provision as defined, however, 
and thus should not lead to a different interpretation of the two provisions 
• Del. tit. 11,5 848; Conn. § 53a-129. 
7
 The required mens tea is knowledge of the regulations that apply to the 
actor's conduct because of his fiduciary responsibilities. There is no re-
quirement of knowledge of the criminal law or the elements of Section 224.-
13. See Section 2.02(9) supra. 
•Section 223.0(1) defines "deprive" to include situations where the actor 
disposes of property "so as to make it unlikely that the owner will recover 
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It is thus only the clearest case of misapplication that is 
covered. The offense is analogous to the reckless endanger-
ment of property; it is the known substantial risk of loss or 
detriment that is the gravamen of the offense.f 
These culpability limitations were thought essential to 
avoid the intrusion of the criminal law into a field that is 
more appropriately the subject of civil treatment. They 
have been accepted in a number of recently drafted codes 
and proposals,10 although some have not followed the Model 
Code recommendations as to all elements of the crime. A 
few states only require a mental state of recklessness with 
regard to the risk of loss or detriment,11 while at least one 
it." The operation of this definition will sometimes make it a close question 
whether conduct by a fiduciary is theft under Section 223.2 or a violation of 
Section 224.13. The difference between the two offenses inheres in the de-
gree of risk of loss involved. If it Is "unlikely" that recovery of the proper-
ty will occur, by which is meant a substantial certainty, then the offense 
might be theft. If there is a "substantial risk," I e.t less certainty of a loss, 
then the offense might be misapplication. The line is a subtle one but there 
can be no escape from having to draw it. Because of this relationship be-
tween the offenses, there is a sense in which Section 224.13 is a lesser in-
cluded offense to Section 223.2. 
• An earlier version of the section made the issue of risk of loss or detri-
ment a matter of affirmative defense to be proved by the defendant and also 
created certain presumptions of knowledge where the actor was a profes-
sional fiduciary or custodian of property for the government or a financial 
institution. See MPC § 206.40, T.D. 2, at 123-24 (1954). This was changed 
largely out of a sense that the section should be simplified and that the bur-
den of proof should be shifted only when clearly necessary. 
»•£. g., Ala. § 13A-9-51; Haw. 5 708-374; Ky. 9 517.110; Ind. § 35-
43-5-3(4); N.J. 9 2C:21-15; N.D. 9 12.1-23-07; Ore. 9 165.095; Pa. tit. 18, 
9 4113; Mich, (p) 9 4155; S.C. (p) 9 19.11; W.Va. (p) 9 61-8-29. 
"Conn. 9 53a-129; Dei. tit. 11, 9 848; N.Y. 9 165.00; Utah 9 76-7-513; 
Vt (p) 9 2.22.3. The culpability required under the Maine and New Hamp-
shire statutes is not clear. The statutes read: 
in a manner which he knows is a violation of his duty and which in-
volves substantial risk of loss. 
Me. tit. 17A, 9 903; N.H. 9 638:11. As worded, "knows" applies only to the 
violation, not to the substantial risk. New Hampshire follows the Model 
Code by providing in its general culpability sections that: 
When the law defining an offense prescribes the kind of culpability that 
is sufficient for its commission, without distinguishing among the mate-
rial elements thereof, such culpability shall apply to all the material ele-
ments, unless a contrary purpose plainly appears. 
N.H. 9 626:2(1). Maine has a virtually identical provision. Me. tit. 17A, § 
11(2). The ambiguity nonetheless remains. 
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allows conviction based on a mens rea of recklessness for all 
elements of the crime.1-
3. Grading. The second sentence of the section grades the 
offense as a misdemeanor if more than $50 is involved and oth-
erwise as a petty misdemeanor. Given the distinction between 
this offense and the misappropriation of property covered by the 
theft offenses, it is clear that there is no case for higher sanc-
tions. Misdemeanor penalties have been accepted as appropriate 
by virtually all recently drafted provisions," although only 
Pennsylvania has accepted the division recommended by the 
Model Code between the misdemeanor and the petty misdemean-
or level.14 Delaware and Texas have graded this offense as a 
felony if the property involved exceeds a certain amount.1'* The 
recent enactment in New Jersey adopts a three-level grading 
scheme with a 10-year maximum for the most serious offense.1" 
§ 2 2 4 . 1 4 Securing Execution of Documents by Deception * 
A person commits a misdemeanor if by deception he causes 
another to execute any instrument affecting, purporting to affect, 
or likely to affect the pecuniary interest of any person. 
" Tex. § 32.45. 
13 E. g.f Ala. $ 13A-9-51; Conn. 5 53a-129; Haw. $ 708-874; Ind. 5 33-
43-5-3(4); Ky. § 517.110; Me. tit. I7A, § 903; NH 5 63811; N.Y. 5 165.00; 
N.D. $ 12.1-23-07; Ore. 5 165.095; Pa. tit. 18, 5 4113. Utah 5 76-&-513; Mich 
(p) 5 4155; W. Va. (p) 5 61-8-29. 
»*Pa. tit. 18, 54113. 
is Del. tit 11, § 848 ($300); Tex. * 32.45 (a felony of the third degree if 
the amount exceeds $200, and a felony of the second degree if the amount 
exceeds $10,000) The proposed Vermont criminal code grades the offense 
as a felony regardless of amount Vt. (p) $ 2 22.3 
•* N.J. 5 2C.21-15. The details of the grading structure are refir -.' »n 
Section 224.8 Comment 5 notes 16-18 supra. Since the grading divisions 
are expressed in terms of the benefit derived by the actor, this departure 
from the Model Code perhaps explains the addition of the language quoted 
in note 5 supra to the New Jersey offense Without such language, the neg-
ative implications of the grading structure might have led to unwarranted 
restriction of the scope of the offense. 
* History. Presented to the Institute as Section 206 20 of Tentative Draft 
No. 2 and considered at the May 1954 meeting. See ALI Proceedings 195-97 
(1954). Reprinted in Tentative Draft No. 4 Presented again to the Institute 
in the Proposed Official Draft and approved at the May 1962 meeting. See 
ALI Proceedings 226-27 (1962). Detailed commentary was originally includ-
ed in Tentative Draft No. 2 at 113-14 (1954). 
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ADDENDUM E 
Instruction No. 8 
Reasonable doubt 
The burden is upon the prosecution to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not require proof to an absolute certainty. A 
reasonable doubt is a doubt based on reason, and one which is reasonable in view of all the 
evidence. It must be reasonable doubt and not a doubt which is merely fanciful or imaginary 
or based on wholly speculative possibility. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is that degree of 
proof which satisfies the mind, convinces the understanding of those who are bound to act 
conscientiously upon it and prevents all reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is a doubt 
which reasonable men and women would entertain, and it must arise from the evidence or 
the lack of evidence in this case. 
<2<n 
Instruction No. 9 
Elements of the offense 
Before you may find Defendant Kimberlee Winward guilty of Unlawful Dealing with 
Property by Fiduciary, as charged in the Information, the state must prove and you must find 
and believe, beyond a reasonable doubt, each and every one of the following elements: 
1. That the defendant was entrusted with property as a Fiduciary for George and 
Marie Bauer; 
2. That the defendant violated her duty to the Bauers; 
3. That the defendant knew that her conduct was in violation of her duty; 
4. That said breach of duty involved an actual or a substantial risk of loss or 
detriment to the Bauers exceeding $1,000; and 
5. That the defendant's violation, if any, occurred in Iron County, Utah on or 
about August 9, 1993. 
If the State of Utah has failed to prove any one or more of the previously described 
elements, you must find the defendant not guilty of the offense charged. However, if the 
state has proved each and every one of the foregoing elements to your satisfaction and 
beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant guilty of Unlawful Dealing of 
Property by Fiduciary, as charged in the Information. 
Cv <v" 
Instruction No. 10 
In these instructions certain words and phrases J/are used which require definitions in 
order that you may properly understand the nature of the crime charged and in order that you 
may properly apply the law as contained in these instructions to the facts as you may find 
them farm the evidence. These definitions are as follows: 
A person engages in conduct "knowingly", or with "knowledge", with respect to her 
conduct or to circumstances surrounding her conduct when she is aware of the nature of her 
conduct or the existing circumstances. A person acts "knowingly", or with "knowledge", 
with respect to a result of her conduct when she is aware that her conduct is reasonably 
certain to cause the result. 
"Property" means anything of value, including real estate, written instruments or 
other writings representing or embodying rights concerning real or personal property. 
You are instructed that "fiduciary" includes anyone who acts for another in a 
relationship implying and necessitating great confidence and trust. The term is not restricted 
to trustees, but also includes relationships such as agent or broker. 
"Fiduciary duty" is a duty to act for someone else's benefit, while subordinating one's 
personal interests to that of the other person. It is the highest standard of duty implied by 
law. 
To "entrust" or "entrusted" means to give over to another something after a relation 
of competence has been established. To deliver to another something in trust or to commit 
something to another with a certain competence regarding his care, use or disposal of it. 
Instruction No. 11 
A principal broker, and real estate agent acting on hisbehalf, who acts solely on 
behalf of the seller owe the seller the following fiduciary duties: 
(a) Loyalty, which obligates the agent to act in the best interest of the seller instead 
of all other interests, including the agent's own interest; 
(b) Obedience, which obligates the agent to obey all lawful instructions from the 
seller; 
(c) Full disclosure, which obligates the agent to tell the seller all material information 
which the agent learns about the buyer or about the transaction; 
(d) Fidelity, which obligates the agent to act only for the seller, and not the buyer, 
unless consent to representation of both is given after full disclosure. 
INSTRUCTION NO. H 
When you retire to consider your verdict, you will select one of your fellow jurors to act 
as foreperson, who, as foreperson, will preside over your deliberations and who will sign the 
verdict to which you agree. Your verdicts in-this case must be as follows: 
1. We, the jury duly empaneled in the above-entitled case, find Defendant 
KIMBERLEE H. WINWARD GUILTY of the offense of Unlawful Dealing with 
Property by a Fiduciary, as charged in the Information; 
OR 
2. We, the jury duly empaneled in the above-entitled case, find Defendant 
KIMBERLEE H. WINWARD NOT GUILTY of the offense of Unlawful Dealing 
with Property by a Fiduciary, as the offense is unproven by the burden of evidence 
required; 
This being a criminal case, unanimous concurrence of jurors is required to find a verdict. 
A written form for each of the above-mentioned possible verdicts will be furnished to you. When 
your verdict has been found, the appropnate spaces must be marked, the form signed and dated 
by your foreperson, and then returned by you to the Court. When your verdict has been found, 
notify the bailiff that you are ready to report to the Court. 
DATED this 2 ^ ? day of November, 1994. 
LYUE/R. ANDERSON 
District Court Judge 
C ^ ° 1 3 
ADDENDUM F 
SCOTT M.BURNS (#4283) 
Iron County Attorney 
97 North Main, Suite #1 
P.O. Box 428 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Telephone: (801) 586-6694 
ShJu&telDtet Court *ifon County 
F I L E D 
MAY 2 7H99A 
_ _ CLERK 
DEPUTY 
2(tL 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR IRON L JUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v$. 
EMER KENT WINWARD and 
KIMBERLEE H. WINWARD, 
Defendants. 
) STATES OBJECTION TO 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO 
) DISQUALIFY SCOTT M. BURNS 
) 
) Criminal Nos. 941500056 
941500057 
) 
Judge James L. Shumate 
COMES NOW the State of Utah, by and through Iron County Attorney Scott M. Burns, 
and respectfully objects to the Defendants' Motion to Disqualify Scott M. Burns from further 
prosecution of the above-entitled matter. 
The State's objection is made on the grounds that the Defendants have failed to set forth 
any statutory basis, ethical reason, or a legally sufficient basis upon which to disqualify the Iron 
County Attorney. The State respectfully responds to the specific allegations set forth in the 
Defendants' Motion to Disqualify as follows, to wit: 
ALLEGATIONS 
ALLEGATION NO. 1. At the outset, Mr. Burns perjured himself in the statement of 
probable cause which he signed in order to obtain arrest warrants for the Defendant and his wife 
falsely stating that: 
IOW 
a. The Defendants "were the real estate agent and attorney representing the 
interests of George and Ann Bauer . . . " (Probable Cause Statement f5) 
b. ''Defendant Kimberlee H. Winward became the selling agent and originally 
advised the Bauers to list the property for sale in the amount of $45,000." (Probable Cause 
Statement %l) 
c+ "Thereafter, Kimberlee H. Winward advised Mr. and Mrs. Bauer to accept 
a cash offer in the amount of $40,000 from one Nicole Packer." (Probable Cause Statement f l ) 
d. [D]uring an interview with Detective Orton on January 5,1994, Defendant 
Emer Kent Winward acknowledged . . . that his wife had full knowledge of said action (the 
alleged forgery) and consented, agreed, and assisted in that taking place." (Probable Cause 
Statement %3) 
Each of these allegations is central to the State's theories of criminal liability. Each of 
these statements is false and unsupported by any evidence. 
Furthermore, and more disturbingly, the police report does not support any of these 
allegations which indicates that Mr. Burns made them right out of whole cloth. Most telling is 
the fact that Detective Orton's account of the January 5 interview with Kent Winward indicates 
that Mr. Winward told the investigator that the subject check was deposited into Mrs. Winward's 
account "to expedite the process in which Nicole would receive her percentage of the profit." 
The investigator's account is completely devoid of any allegation made by Kent Winward 
regarding his wife's knowledge of the process by which the subject check was endorsed or 
deposited. 
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RESPONSE NO. lfaV Detective Kelvin Orton of the Cedar City Police Department 
submitted a report to the Iron County Attorney's Office (seg Exhibit "A", attached hereto and 
incorporated herein, and hereinafter referred to as "Detective Orton's report") that contained an 
interview with Nicole Packer on December 10, 1993 (relating to the sale of the George and Ann 
Marie Bauer home) which states, "Kim and Kent Winward needed Nicole Packer as a partner to 
list as the original buyer for appearances." Moreover, Detective Orton's report contains an 
interview with Mitch Schoppmann, Cedar Land and Title, on January 4, 1994, that quotes 
Schoppmann as saying, "The property located at 171 North 800 West was bought and sold in 
basically the same transaction." Mr. Schoppmann further stated that "according to Cedar Land 
and Title personnel, Kent Winward handled the paperwork concerning this real estate transaction 
including closing." 
Clearly, the prosecutor preparing a probable cause statement would be led to believe that 
Mr. and Mrs. Winward were acting on behalf of George and Ann Marie Bauer as related to the 
sale of the subject property. 
RESPONSE NO. Kb) and KcV Detective Orton's report sets forth an interview with Mr. 
Tom Goodman, ERA Realty, on January 10, 1994, wherein Mr. Goodman stated "he did not 
handle the actual sale of the property and was just the listing agent. Kim Winward (also of ERA 
Realty) was the 'selling agent' and handled all negotiations with the buyer." Goodman also stated 
to Detective Orton that "all the information regarding the sale of the property would have come 
through Kim Winward." 
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In an interview with George Bauer on January 10, 1994, Mr. Bauer informed Detective 
Orton that "they originally were advised to list the property for $45,000 . . . they received an 
offer of $40,000 cash which they eventually agreed to." 
In that Mr. Goodman and Defendant Kimberlee H. Winward both worked for ERA Realty, 
and based upon Detective Orton's report that Mr. Goodman asserted "he was just the listing 
agent" and "Kim Winward was the selling agent and all of the negotiations came through her," 
a prosecutor preparing the probable cause statement would be led to believe that Defendant 
Kimberlee H. Winward (the selling agent) would have been the person to advise on the sale 
amount ($45,000) and would have been the person to advise Mr. and Mrs. Bauer to sell for 
$40,000." 
RESPONSE NO. KdV Detective Orton informed the Iron County Attorney, verbally, 
while the Iron County Attorney was preparing the probable cause statement, that Defendant Kent 
Winward stated that Defendant Kim Winward knew Defendant Kent Winward was going to sign 
Nicole Packer's name to the subject check (which is alleged to have been forged), and she further 
knew that Defendant Kent Winward was going to deposit the check into her (Defendant Kim 
Winward's checking account). The State alleges that this assertion was also based upon (and the 
Court agreed in its findings as set forth in the preliminary hearing transcript, p. 262) the fact that 
Defendant Kimberlee H. Winward made her checking account available to Defendant E. Kent 
Winward and then wrote funds out of that account, specifically the $1,160 check to Ms. Packer. 
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The State asserts, by the Defendants' failure to challenge or argue, that all other 
allegations contained in the probable cause statement were true and based upon appropriate 
evidence. Finally, the State asserts that a "probable cause statement" is made by prosecuting 
attorneys in support of a information and arrest warrant and is just that, a statement that 
"probable cause" exists to support the alleged offenses. Clearly, if the State were held to only 
setting forth completely unrefutable assertions in the probable cause statement, there would be 
no need for (a) a preliminary hearing or (b) a trial, and upon submission of the probable cause 
statement, all parties could simply move to the sentencing phase. 
ALLEGATION NO. 2. During the noon recess of the preliminary hearing, Mr. Bums 
accosted defense counsel in the halls of the courthouse and invited defense counsel to set (sic) 
outside, apparently for the purpose of some physical altercation. 
RESPONSE NO. 2. The State of Utah asserts that Iron County Attorney Scott M. Bums 
did not accost defense counsel in the halls of the courthouse and did not invite counsel outside 
for the purpose of some physical altercation. If the Court is interested in the particulars of those 
allegations, please refer to Exhibit "B", attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference. 
ALLEGATION NO. 3. When challenged regarding the inaccuracy of the probable cause 
statement and his behavior at the preliminary hearing, Mr. Bums responded with name-calling 
and more false accusations. 
RESPONSE NO. 3. Again, the State of Utah asserts that Iron County Attorney Scott M. 
Bums did not engage in any engage in any "name-calling" or "false accusations" at the 
preliminary hearing. The Court is again directed to review State's Exhibit "B" which is attached 
hereto. 
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ALLEGATION NO. 4. Mr. Burns' comments to the press have been unethical and 
inappropriate. 
RESPONSE NO. 4. The State denies that Iron County Attorney Scott M. Burns has made 
any comments to the press that have been unethical and inappropriate. In fact, the Iron County 
Attorney was misquoted by a Daily Spectrum newspaper reporter, and upon reading the article, 
the Iron County Attorney responded in what would appear to be the appropriate and professional 
manner (see Exhibit "C", attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference). 
ALLEGATION NO. 5. Mr. Burns1 conduct of the prosecution of this matter evidences 
an irrational and unjustifiable animus toward the Defendants. 
RESPONSE NO. 5. The Iron County Attorney received information that certain citizens 
had made complaints that Defendants Emer Kent Winward and Kimberlee H. Winward had 
committed criminal offenses. Thereafter, Cedar City Police Detective Kelvin Orton investigated 
the case, presented Mr. Burns with a police report, and the case was screened by Detective Orton 
and the Iron County Attorney. Thereafter, a criminal information and probable cause statement 
were prepared, and the Defendants were charged with felony counts, have received all of their 
constitutional rights and protections to date, and were bound over after a preliminary hearing. 
If the foregoing is "unjustifiable animus" toward the Defendants, I suppose one could argue that 
anytime the State's prosecutor files charges against certain defendants and prosecutes the case 
pursuant to the laws of the State of Utah, there is "unjustifiable animus." In any event, the State 
of Utah denies any bias, prejudice, or ulterior motives related to the prosecution of this case. 
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Based upon the foregoing, the State of Utah asserts that the Iron County Attorney should 
not be removed from the prosecution of this case. 
DATED this 2-3~ day of May, 1994. 
SCOTT M. BURNS 
Iron County Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a full, true, and correct copy of the within and 
foregoing STATE'S OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISQUALIFY SCOTT M. 
BURNS, by first-class mail, postage fully prepaid, on this day of May, 1994, to the 
following, to wit: 
Mr. Gary W Pendleton, Esq. 
Attorney for Defendant 
150 North 200 East, Suite 202 
St. George, UT 84770 
Secretary 
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Cedar City Police Department 
Incident File 
ncident Number: 93-8267 Nature of Incident: Foraery 
tfense Code: FUR6 Incident Address: 26 N M a m 
City 
omplainant: 
ast: Packer 
Address 
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ocation Code 
ow Received? 
qency Code 
ate Occurred 
ate Reported 
irue D i s p a t c h e r 
ime Completed 
ate Disp Declared 
The complainant 
Cedar City 
Contact Person: 
State: UT 
First: Nicole 
840 S Main « 316 
Cedar City ST 
7 
P 
CCPD 
12/10/93 
15/10/93 
13:00 
13:30 
01/21/94 
alleges forgery to a 
UT ZIP: fi4720 
Received By 
Responding Officer 
Responsible Officer 
Time Occurred 
Time Reported 
Time Arrived 
Disposition Code 
Miscellaneous Entry 
check issued b>' Crdar 
(Time Spent: 30 
ZIP: 64720 
< Name Number: 29900 
Middle: 
Phone tt: (801)865-0662 
DOB: 12/30/74 
K Orton 
K Orton 
K Orton 
13:25 
13:00 
13:00 
CAA 
Ko 
Land & Title. 
The cheer wac endorsed and deposited 
Mountain America. The payee listed on 
into the suspect is; account at 
tne check is Nicole Packer. 
No included Offenses for this incident. 
/oe 
ssrsr 
w 
M 
4rl 
W 
m 
in 
« 
m 
M 
m 
m 
m 
INVGi-VI 
Record tt 
.t-.».-r.=:.> 
29900 
30336 
£6414 
97 
38337 
760 
30336 
17460 
1&K93 
30330 
10093 
17460 
NG 
Date 
12/10/93 
12/10/93 
12/10/93 
IE/10/93 
12/10/93 
1E/1B/93 
12/10/93 
12/10/93 
12/10/93 
1L/10/93 
12/10/93 
12/10/93 
Description 
nr = sr^=r=ru= = = = = = = =:^=r:=^rr=: 
Packer, Nicole 
Schoppmann, Mitchell 
Goodsell, Garry 
Orton, Kelvin 
Williams, Patricia 
tauer, George 
Bauer, Ann 
Winward, Kimberlee 
Wmward, tmer 
Goodman, 1 homas 
Winward, Emer 
Uinward, Kimberlee 
Fv'elationship 
complainant 
Involved Party 
Involved Party 
Investigator 
Invo1ved Party 
Victim 
Vietam 
Suspect 
ousoect 
In VOJve d Par t v 
Arrestee 
Arrestee 
9t» 
"i i t i a 1 Information: 
On 12/10/93 at 1300 hrs I was contacted by Nicole Packer who 
jvised that she had been partners in a real estate transaction 
ith Kim and Kent Winward which involved buying a property and 
filing the same property to another buyer for a substantial 
rofit. Kim Winward explained that the property being purchased 
as located at 171 N 600 W CDC and was presently owned by George 
nd Ann Marie Bauer, the property would then be sold to another 
uyer Vicky and Dan Bassett the day the purchase from Bauer 
losed. 
Kim Winward told Packer that the transaction would not look 
thical if Kim Winward was represented as the buyer and then sold 
he property to another buyer for profit. Kim Winward is an 
gent for ERA Realty representing George Bauer, therefore, Kim 
nd Kent Winward needed Nicole Packer as a partner to list as the 
riginal buyer for appearances. Winward advised Packer that the 
rofits would be split into thirds, each of them taking a equal 
hare. 
nterview: Mitch Schoppm&nn 
On 1/4/94 this investigator met with Schoppmann who advised 
;he property loccnted at 171 N 600 W was bought and then scld in 
basically the same transaction. According to Schoppmann the 
locuments indicate that Nicole Packer purchased the property for 
>40,000.00 and then sold the property the same day for $56,000.00 
;o Dan fi\Vicky Bassett. The money for the transaction was beinq 
supplied by Patricia Williams of Las Vegas Nevada. The buyer 
Nicole Packer then turned her interest over to Patricia Williams 
flaking Patricia Williams the principal holder of the property 
trust deed. Dan & Vicky Bassett would then make payments through 
~edar Land & Title to Patricia Williams at a 13# interest for the 
purchase of the property. 
According to Cedar Land & Title personnel, Kent Winward 
Dandled the paperwork concerning this real estate transaction 
inc1uding closiny. 
fts a result of this meeting it was found that Kim Winward 
would have collected a commission check for the George Bauer & 
Nicole Parker transaction as well as a share in the profit. 
Interview: Emer Kent Winward 
On 61/05/94 thrs investigator met with Mr.Winward who 
spontaneously told this investigator he had forged Nicole 
backer's name to the check $4697.50 issued by Cedar Land & Title 
<\n6 deposited into his wife's account. Kent Winward states he-
endorsed Nicole's name to the -check and deposited the check into 
Kim's account to expedite the process in which Nicole would 
receive her percentage of the profit. 
Kent Winward states that the profit Agreement between the 
involved parties was that Nicole Packer would receive a total of 
$2,000.00. $1,000.00 when the deal closed and then ^n additional 
*;i,000.68 when the Winward's collected tne down payment frrm 
Vicky Bassett. Q ^T~ 
•*••* i.H v^-.wr! -il-.- «?t.*te«-, t . \ \ >» • c..^ ~ <•• T-'<.\c'ri.'c>r ha;s. /:. saf.ecJ *'im 
however, the Winward's concurred with the behavior at that time. 
Mr. Winward has supplied this investigator with duplicate checks 
which he believes to be forgeries. The documents Mr. Winward 
supplied this investigator will accompany this report. 
Interview: George Bauer / Ann Marie Bauer 
On 1/10/94 this investigator contacted George Bauer and his 
wife Ann Marie Bauer in Henderson Nevada, they state the property 
located at 171 N 800 U was originally listed at $45,000.00 
through ERA Realty, the asking price was lowered to $43,000.00 
after the property had been on the market for approximately one 
(1) yeATm The Bauer's state they received an offer of $40,000.00 
cash which they considered and eventually agreed to. George Bauer 
told this investigator that he did not feel comfortable with this 
transaction from the start, stating "it was as though someone was 
trying to buy low and then sell for a greater profit0 this 
statement was uttered prior to this investigator informing the 
Bauer's of the investigation. 
The Bauer' *, state that the proposal was for $40,000.00 cash 
&nd their information was that the money was being wired to 
Xicole Packer from her parents for the purchase of the property. 
Mr. Bauer states there was no mention of the property being sold 
to anyone else other then Nicole Packer or that the property was 
being re-sold for an amount greater then 40,000.00 
Ann Marie Bauer reiterates that the sell of the property 
kas suspicious, especially to George, however, they decided to go 
forward Vith the sell due to circumstance in their personal life. 
The Bauer's were not familiar with Kim Winward and advised 
this investigator that Tom & Milba Goodman were the listing 
agents, however, the Bauer's felt positive the Goodman's were 
lot involved in the deceit that took place. 
Interview: Tom Goodman 
On 01/10/94 I contacted Tom Goodman in reference to my 
ronversation with the Bauer's. Goodman states that he did not 
candle the actual sell of the property and was just the listing 
\gent through ERA Realty. This investigator was informed that 
vim Winward was the selling agent and handled all the 
negotiations with the buyer. Goodman told this investigator all 
;he information regarding the sell of the property would have 
rame through Kim Winward. Goodman was not aw;are the property had 
>een re-sold in the^same transaction until after the fact and 
>ven then was >/GTy surprised. 
Through my conversation with Goodman I found the commission 
3r the sell was split into third's, one part going to the 
.-anchise, one part tt« Goodman, and one part to Winward. 
Goodman'?- v eccl'lection of the transaction was vague but did 
a/ what information he relayed to the Bauer's would have came 
roar. Kim Winward. 
nterview: Garry Goodsell Q W 
On tfl/lP/94 this investigator contacted Garry GoodseDl in 
Goodseil researched the transaction and found that Patricia 
Llliams had sold a property located in Fiddlers Canyon, Cdcf 
lit #1 lot 2, Block 5, to Berry & Teresa Gracely. When Gracely's 
btain financing for the property a check was issued to Patricia 
illiams in the amount of approximately $68,900.00 this check was 
ent to Southern Utah Title who would forward the check to 
illiams. Patricia Williams endorsed the check back to Southern 
bah Title with the following instructions, $45,000.00 be sent to 
edar Land & Title in the form of a Trust Deed in the name of 
icole Packer with Patricia Williams as the principal interest 
older. The remaining balance would be issued back to Patricia 
illiams in the form of a check which was $23,242.72. 
To Garry Goodseil1s knowledge this was the extent of 
outhern Utah Title's involvement. 
ountain America: 
On 01/12/94 this investigator contacted Tonya, at 
nerica Credit Union. I was advised that deposit ships 
n microfiche in Salt Lake City and would be available 
ubpoena. 
ollow-Up Investigation: 
»ate: 01/21/94 
detective: Ko 
On 81/21/94 This investigator contacted Sally Melling at 
ledar Land & Title who discovered another possible fraud and 
Forgery pertaining to an earnest money sales agreement handled 
„hvougl. Cedar Land & Title and involved Kim Uinward. Mrs. Melling 
^ecogni7ed the writing on the legal document as Kim Winward's. 
The document shows Dan and Vicky Bassett supplying *100.08 
earnest money to ERA Realty and provides a buyer's signature, 
signed by Dan Bassett. The Seller's signature represents Nicole 
-'acker, however, the signature is an obvious forgery based on the 
actual signature of Nicole Packer. The Dan Bassett signature 
list's a signing date of 07/25/93. The Nicole Packer signature 
(Forger/) list's a signing uate of 07/26/93. The date of document 
receipt with Da- bassett's signature is 07/15/93. 
Contact with ERA Realty: 
Sally Melling contacted ERA Realty and talked with agent Tom 
Gc,odn«<.;v., Gcooma;» «uvi*=ed lhat the only transaction Ef;A was 
involved with wa*> the Sell to Nicole Packer, the first 
transaction. The second trav.»action between Packer and Bassett 
was handled independently. 
On 01/21/94 this investigator contacted E.RA "sealty and 
talked with Lori Cood»ell who advised that ERA had no record of 
•receiving earnest money pertaining to Packer and Bassett. 
Goodseil explains thai usually the acer.t signs the earnest 
money agreement adjacent to the "Bfak&rage" line listed as 
••Received by". In the -..ase cf ti*is document there is written in 
the provided line Mtc« be deposited upon closing'1. 
93 
Mountain 
were kept 
by 
^a 
>J 1.0 NDRTH^MAIN V586.-99B4
 : 
CEDAR :Cnx UT 84720 */* STATE BANK or souTHeRN.uTAh 
C«dar C&y Office 
P.O.* Box 3*0 
Ofr Oty, Utah 647214340. 
FOUR THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED NINETY SEVEN DOLLARS AND 50/100* ^^S^T*3 
DATE 
r n Aug. 9.199>> 
Nicole Packer 
AMOUNT 
$ 4697.50 
^^lNccc^•lArirr^ L _J 
CEDAR UNO TITLE, INC. 
E: OETACH THIS STATEMENT BEFORE DEPOSITING CHECK CLOSING TRUST 
11090 
uyer: Vickie R. Bassett 
?ller: Nicole Packer 
Z525.00 Sellers Proceeds 
2172.50 Refund of overpayment in wire transfer 
NON NEGOTIABLE OS-VA1 
9/ 
IRON COUNTY ATTORNEY 
97 North Main, Suite #1 • P.O. Box 428 • Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Telephone: (801) 586-6694 Telecopier: (801) 586-2737 
SCOTT M. BURNS, COUNTY ATTORNEY KYLE D. LATIMER, CHIEF DEPUTY 
May 27, 1994 
The Honorable Jan Graham 
Utah Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
RE: State v. Winward Fifth District Court Criminal No. 941500056 
Attorney Gary W. Pendleton 
Dear General Graham: 
Mr. Gary W. Pendleton previously requested that you remove me from this case (see 
Exhibit "A") and I responded (see Exhibit "B"); he now makes a similar request (see Exhibit "C") 
and has also filed a Motion for Change of Judge (see Exhibit "D"). Mr. Pendleton's accusations 
were also forwarded to the Utah State Bar and have been dismissed as Mr. Pendleton refused to 
submit the same in authorized form within the required time frame. 
Mr. Pendleton is a fine lawyer and is aggressively defending his clients. I believe, 
however, that Mr. Pendleton has used questionable tactics in this case (accusing me of perjury 
in a probable cause statement and alleging I threatened him physically) and is currently seeking 
my removal as another ploy to intimidate the prosecution and move the focus away from the 
central issue, to wit: the guilt or innocence of his clients. 
Please know that it is my desire to prosecute this case through jury trial (scheduled for 
July 26 through July 29, 1994); if Mr. Pendleton's clients are acquitted, I am certain he will cease 
in his various complaints to your office and other governmental entities. 
Respectfully, 
Scott M. Burns 
Iron County Attorney 
SMBxm 
Attachments 
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GARY W. PENDLETON 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
ISO North 200 East, Suite 202, St. George, Utah 64770 
Telephone (801)628-4411 
Fax Number (801) 628-9260 
February 22,1994 
E/fi/B/r ''A" 
Scott M. Burns 
Iron County Attorney 
97 North Main, Suite 1 
P. O. Box 428 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Re: State v. Winward 
Dear Mr. Burns: 
I believe that your conduct in this case disqualifies you from its further prosecution. I refer 
to two incidents, both of which I believe you are well aware: False statements set out in the 
affidavit in support of the issuance of the arrest warrant and, more significantly, your 
conduct in the lobby at the Cedar City Hall of Justice. 
While I can overlook some of the inaccuracies in the affidavit which you authored and 
signed, given the theory of the State's case, I cannot lightly dismiss the allegation regarding 
Mr. Winward's alleged legal representation of Mr. and Mrs. Bauer. The inclusion of this 
material in the affidavit is at least evidence of a conscious disregard for the truth. 
However, more importantly, I refer to your conduct during the noon recess on Friday, 
February 18,1994. As counsel for one who is accused of a criminal offense, I have not only 
the right but the duty to represent that client zealously within the bounds of the law and the 
cannons of ethics. I am free to do so without the prospect of being accosted in the halls of 
the courthouse by the state's attorney and invited outside, apparently for the purpose of 
some physical altercation. 
I could dismiss the incident if I were to regard you as nothing more than a bully with a law 
degree. However, you are more than that You represent the power and authority of the 
State of Utah when you prosecute criminal cases. Accordingly, I cannot in good conscience, 
as a member of this Bar, allow the State to make such an assault upon what I view as my 
clients' constitutional right to due process of law and their right to be represented by 
counsel. 
D C r r i \ / r - N rr* « i —-. 
February 22, 1994 
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I am therefore requesting that you immediately request the assistance of the Attorney 
GeneraTs office in the prosecution of this case. Furthermore, I am sending them a copy of 
this letter, given their supervisory authority over county attorneys pursuant to U.CA. 67-5-
1(5). 
Finally, I am sending a copy of this letter to Bar Counsel for his consideration and review. 
Sincerely, 
Gary W. Pendleton 
GWP:cch 
cc: Kent and Kimberlee Winward 
Jan Graham, Utah Attorney General 
Stephen Trost 
?7 
IRON COUNTY ATTORNEY 
97 North Main, Suite #1 • P.O. Box 428 • Cedar City, Utah 84720 
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SCOTT M. BURNS, COUNTY ATTORNEY KYLE D. LATIMER, CHIEF DEPUTY 
March 1, 1994 
EXffierr "3" 
Mr. Gary W. Pendleton, Esq. 
Attorney at Law 
150 North 200 East, Suite 202 
St. George, UT 84770 
RE: State of Utah vs. Emer Kent Winward and Kimberlee H. Winward 
Fifth Judicial District Court, Criminal Nos. 941500056 and 941500057 
Dear Mr. Pendleton: 
Given your highly emotional demeanor at the preliminary hearing in the above-referenced 
case, I can understand your frustration in having to accept the fact that both of your clients were 
bound over on two (2) second-degree felonies. I cannot understand your attempt to involve the 
Utah Attorney General or Bar Counsel. 
As you will recall, the Court ordered you on several occasions to "move back away" from 
the State!s witnesses. Moreover, I, during a late afternoon break prior to closing arguments, told 
you that (a) I didn't appreciate your attempts to intimidate witnesses, (b) I couldn't believe that 
you would engage in "snickering and laughing" loudly during the State's presentation of evidence, 
and (c) your actions were embarrassing to me as a member of the Bar and that I had lost a great 
deal of respect for you. As you will also recall, your clients and their family members gathered 
around during our discussion, and I inquired as to whether or not you would like to step outside. 
I find it almost humorous that you would interpret that request as a threat to harm you physically. 
Mr. Pendleton, I believe in the judicial system and do my best to effectuate justice. As 
a county attorney, I do not "win or lose cases" and I find no joy in prosecuting a case that alleges 
a young lawyer and a young realtor committed serious felonies. That said, you must know that 
I take great offense when a lawyer attempts to intimidate or ridicule witnesses who have been 
subpoenaed to testify.- Many of those witnesses (as well as other persons present during court 
that day) called me or came to my office after the hearing and described you as a "rabid dog," 
a "jerk," a "bully," and an "actor trying to take over the courtroom." 
In that I had never dealt with you in court before, I believed that you were a fine lawyer 
and a gentleman. I have since learned that your reputation for in-court sarcastic antics and 
intimidation of witnesses is well-known by prosecutors and other members of the Bar in southern 
Utah. I would only hope that in future proceedings regarding the above-referenced case, and 
8fc> 
Mr. Gary W. Pendleton, Esq. 
March 1, 1994 
Page 2 
other dealings we may have together, we may treat each other with respect and act as 
professionals while representing our respective interests. 
If your letter was an attempt to open an investigation, I welcome any inquiries. If your 
letter was an attempt to have me removed from prosecuting this case, I decline. If your letter 
was an attempt to embarrass both of us by your whining, I am afraid you have succeeded. 
Sincerely, 
Scott M. Burns 
Iron County Attorney 
SMB:cm 
Attachment 
pc: Jan Graham, Utah Attorney General 
Stephen Trost 
P.S. While we are addressing each other's ethics and competency, I would suggest you 
consider a letter from my good friend Loni F. DeLand that I have attached hereto. Judge Eves 
and Judge Braithwaite have instructed lawyers in the Fifth District (private and appointed) to 
consider Mr. DeLandfs concerns. I hope you will take the appropriate steps to protect your 
clients1 interests. 
S5~ 
U T A H ASSOCIATION O F 
C R I M I N A L D E F E N S E L A W Y E R S 
PA. BOX S1Q64* 
SAUT LAKE CITY, UTAH 64181-0646 
January 12, 1994 
Honorable Robert T. Braithvaite 
Fifth District court 
40 North 100 East 
Cedar'*City, UT 84720 
SUBJECT: Conflicts of Interest Claims Regarding Multiple 
Defendant Representation 
Dear Judge Braithvaite, 
It has come to the attention of the officers of this 
organisation that a number of appointed defense attorneys in courtB 
other than the Wasatch Front courts are being required to represent 
multiple defendants in criminal prosecutions. Those defense 
counsel that have raised concerns about this practice generally 
cite the budgetary concerns of the various counties as being the 
primary reason for multiple defendant appointments. 
We - are also aware that criminal defendants are becoming 
increasingly litigious in the appeal and writ processes around the 
country in raising issues of ineffective assistance of counsel 
under a variety of claims. One of the areas in which convicted 
defendants are increasingly bringing ineffective assistance claims 
is in the case of conflicts of interest arising from multiple 
representation. 
Although multiple representation is not a per se violation of 
Sixth Amendment rights (Burger v. Kemp. 483 U.S. 776 (1987), the 
U.S. supreme Court has noted that a possible conflict of interest 
inheres in almost every instance- of -.multiple representation, 
cuvler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980)'. Of course, multiple 
attorneys from the same law firm representing more than one 
defendant presents the same problem as one attorney doing the same 
thing. 
Hollowav v. ArkansaB. 435 U.S. 475 (1978) first enunciated 
the "automatic reversal" remedy in multiple representation/conflict 
of interest cases where the "possibility" of a conf iiot was brought 
to the attention of the court. 
Cjuylex, also* held that a defendant Who. makes a showing (of - a 
potential conflict) hfifid nafi demonstrate prejudice to establish a 
Sixth Amendment claim. 446 U.S. at .349-350. 
SENT BY^ueoar ouy 
The courts will presume prejudice in cases which meet the 
fiuxlfX standard. The general standard regarding ineffective 
assistance of counsel, i.e., the two-prong test set forth in 
Strickland v. Washington. 446 U.S. 668 (1984), is a greater 
standard than is required in conflict claims. The Strickland court 
addressed the different and less vigorous test applied in conflict 
cases: 
In Cuyler...[ve] held that prejudice is 
presumed when counsel is burdened by an actual 
conflict of interest* In those circumstances, 
counsel breaches the duty of loyalty, perhaps 
the most basic of counsel's duties* Moreover, 
it is difficult to measure the precise effect 
on the' defense of representation corrupted by 
conflicting interests. Given the obligation 
of counsel to. avoid conflicts of interest and 
the ability of trial courts to make an earlV 
incruiry in certain situations likely to give 
rise to conflicts.. .it is reasonable for the 
criminal justice system to maintain a fairly 
rigid rule of presumed prejudice for conflicts 
of interest. At 692. 
(EmphasiB added.) 
It is no Becret that the Utah Supreme Court is dissatisfied with 
the quality of appellate defense representation. Justice Kali's 
present committee respecting creation of a statewide indigent 
appellate defense association evidences the court's concern on the 
appellate level. The court's concerns are no less significant at 
the trial level, 
one of the areas that is of growing concern to our courts is 
some rural counties.' preference to letting contracts for indigent 
defense to the lowest bidder, irrespective of the quality of the 
representation. Another is this issue of multiple representation 
and its potential for burdening the appeals courts with claims. 
In the U.S. District Court there is an absolute prohibition 
against appointment of-counsel.for ©pre .than one defendant. And, 
in those rare~ cases where a' privately retained lawyer attempts to 
represent more than one defendant, either personally or through a 
law partner, the courts place the burden of- demonstrating a lack of 
conflict (and the entry of an exprefii, informed waiver) squarely on 
the defense counsel and the defendants. This problem is so closely 
scrutinized that neither I, nor any of my colleagues, can even 
recall an instance of multiple representation by a Utah lawyer or 
law firm in the federal district court in Salt Lake. 
Moreover, the appointment of counsel in the federal courts as 
well as the appointment of investigators and approval for expenses 
are all done sx parte pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act. Those 
courts recognize, unlike many of our state courts, that anytime a 
' *"- ---«•<«<«**« in aooointxnent decisions or 
SENT BY:Cedar City v 2-28-94 : I S M R MALI III- .in 
decisions relating to appointment of investigators or other 
reasonable and necessary defense expenses there is a clear Sixth 
Amendment intrusion. 
I would also invite your attention to Rule 1.7, Utah Rules or 
Professional Conduct which states, intST &li&, that no lawyer 
undertake any multiple representation without the consent of each 
client after consultation (wherein the potential for conflict is 
discussed). Where you, as judges, make appointments at first 
appearances, for multiple defendants, there has obviously been no 
opportunity for consultation with the prospective lawyer, ergo, 
there is a EST £S violation of Rule 1.7. 
After discussing this issue with the executive committee, I 
would suggest that the only sure way to avoid a conflict is to 
follow the example of the federal courts, i.e., judiciously avoid 
ajm multiple appointments. 
Palling adoption of the above stated policy, the second most 
prudent option would be to conduct an inquiry with each indigent 
defendant in a multiple defendant case wherein the potential for 
conflicts are discussed and each is then required to waive any such 
conflicts before the appointment can be made. 
The problem remains, however, that every possible conflict 
cannot be addressed early on and will frequently arise at a stage 
in the proceedings when plea offers (often disparate) are made 
where decisions regarding whether defendant(s) ought to testify are 
necessary or when the defense lawyer is faced with trial evidence 
which is objectionable to one defendant, but not to another. X 
would suggest therefore, that you continue to make inquiries, on 
the record, fix SfiX&s, of defendants ajui counsel concerning 
potential conflicts. 
As stated above, although the federal policy is the safest 
option, if defendants and counsel, in multiple representation 
cases, are thoroughly examined regarding conflicts and potential 
conflicts at the onset and throughout the proceedings, you stand a 
greater chance of stemming the growing tide of post conviction 
claims of ineffective assistanoe of counsel based on conflict, 
claims. 
President 
GARY W. PENDLETON 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
S~S /<^50n3^5^J^,Sdte202,SLG«^^ 
(( J / \ y Telephone (S< 
Utah 84770 
(801)62S-4411 
Fax Number (801) 628-9260 
May 17,1994 
Jan Graham 
Utah Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
E/HlStT "C /< 
Re: State vs. Winward 
Iron County Criminal No. 941500056 
Dear Ms. Graham: 
Enclosed is a copy of a motion which we have filed in the above-referenced matter seeking 
the disqualification of the Iron County Attorney as prosecutor in this matter. We are 
providing you with a copy of the motion because you have supervisory authority ovei; the 
various county attorneys pursuant U.CA. 67-5-1(5). 
We are also providing you with a courtesy copy of our statement of points and authorities 
in support of our pending motion to quash the bind over order. This pleading is provided 
in order to provide you a factual background against which you may evaluate the motion to 
disqualify Mr. Burns. 
Respec 
Gary W. Pendletbn 
GWPrdap 
Enclosures 
pc: Scott M. Burns 
RECEIVED MAY 1 8 1994 
s-l 
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GARY W. PENDLETON (2564) 
Attorney for Defendants 
150 North 200 East, Suite 202 
St George, Utah 84770 
Ph: 628-4411 
** 7 N » ZXtU&iT "j> 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KIMBERLEE H. WINWARD, 
Defendant 
MOTION FOR CHANGE 
OF JUDGE 
Case No. 941500057 
Defendant, by and through her attorney, Gary W. Pendleton, hereby requests 
that another judge be appointed for the purpose of considering Defendant's Motion to 
Quash the Bind Over Order issued by the Honorable James L. Shumate. This motion is 
made on the grounds and for the reasons that Judge Shumate was the committing magistrate 
and it is unreasonable and unfair to the court and to the defendant to expect the court to 
review the soundness of its own order. 
DATED this / / day of] 
Gary W. Pendleton 
Attorney for Defendants 
^O 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I do hereby certify that on this 17*1 day of May, 1994,1 did personally mail 
a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing Motion to Scott M. Burns, Iron County 
Attorney, at 97 North Main, #1, Cedar City, Utah 84720. 
Secretary 
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SCOTT M BURNS, COUNTY ATTORNEY KYLE D. LATIMER, CHIEF DEPUTY 
February 22, 1994 
Mr. Steve Law 
DAILY SPECTRUM 
66 Harding Avenue 
Cedar City, UT 84720 
RE: State of Utah vs. Emer Kent Winward and Kimberlee H. Winward 
Dear Steve: 
As you know, I have tried to be very accessible and helpful to you over the past several 
months with respect to your duties as a journalist for the Daily Spectrum newspaper. I have 
appreciated the fact that you have always contacted me prior to quoting me in the newspaper, and 
I believe that you have always represented my statements in a fair and accurate manner. 
However, after leaving town Friday evening and not returning until late Monday evening, I was 
somewhat dismayed to read your article of February 19, 1994, entitled, "Attorney, realtor wife 
plead not guilty to fraud." 
Specifically, the article read: 
"Kent Winward faces possible disbarment if found guilty," said 
Iron County Attorney Scott Burns. "The Utah Bar Council is also 
conducting their own investigation into Winward's actions," he said. 
As you know, I did not make any comment (either in my argument to the Court or in any 
discussions with you) about Mr. Winward facing possible disbarment. Moreover, the only 
comment I made with respect to the Utah Bar conducting an investigation was by way of 
disclosure to the Court that I had been contacted by the Bar Council and informed that I had a 
duty to provide them with certain information regarding this prosecution. 
Please know that this case is difficult enough for me, as it relates to a fellow member of 
the Utah Bar, and I very much resent having statements attributed to me with respect to whether 
or not Mr. Winward faces disbarment. Please know that I have absolutely no idea what sanctions 
(if any) Mr. Winward faces, and I do not have the sufficient background or knowledge to even 
comment on that issue. Had you asked me that question, I would have simply replied, "I have 
no idea whether or not Mr. Winward will face any sanctions by the Utah Bar." 
~7~7 
Mr. Steve Law 
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1 would request, after reviewing this letter, that you contact Mr. Winwardfs attorney, Gary 
Pendleton, and ask him whether or not a retraction or statement setting aside the quote attributed 
to me would be desirous. If he responds in the affirmative, I would request a retraction of the 
quote attributed to me and replaced by what my response would have been, "I have no idea 
whether or not Mr. Winward will face any sanctions by the Utah Bar." If Mr. Pendleton believes 
that a retraction would simply draw more attention to the case and my purported quote, then I 
would ask that you not print a retraction. 
Should you have any questions, comments, or concerns regarding this communication, 
please do not hesitate to contact my offices. 
Sincerely. 
Scott M. Burns 
Iron County Attorney 
SMBxm 
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pc: Gary W. Pendleton, Esq. 
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Attorney, realtor wife plead not guilty to fraud 
By STEVELAW 
StaFwrlter 
CEDAR CITY — Cedar City 
lawyer Emer Kent Winward and 
his wife Kimberlee, a realtor, 
pleaded not guilty to charges of 
forgery and unlawful dealing of 
property by feduciaiy, each a 
second degree felony, during 
their preliminary hearing Friday 
at 5th District Court. 
The Winwards will be bound 
over for Jury trial that will begin 
as soon as eight Jurors are 
selected and the Involved parties 
have had time to prepare evi-
dence. 
Kejit Winward faces possible 
disbarment if found guilty, said 
Iron County Attorney Scott 
Burns. The Utah Bar Council is 
also conducting their own inves-
tigation into Winwards actions, 
he said. 
The complaint against the 
Winwards was first filed in 
December by Nicole Packer, a 
former employee of Kim's, who 
alleges she discovered Kent 
Winward had forged a check for 
$$.697.50 from the Cedar Land 
aad Title Company that was 
n&de out to her. Upon Investi-
gating the case, Burns said other 
questionable acts allegedly per-
formed by the couple involving 
the same issue were discovered. 
On Aug. 9. 1993. Kim and 
Kent Winward used Packer as 
an interim signer when they pur-
chased property from George and 
Marie Bauer of Henderson. Nev., 
Burns said. The Winwards 
allegedly told George Bauer they 
had a buyer who had $40,000 
cash. They had Packer sign the 
contract as the buyer with money 
received from her father. Burns 
said. 
Packer said she did not receive 
money from her father. She said 
the money came from Pat 
Williams, a real estate broker 
from Las Vegas, who was told 
the house, was selling for 
$45,000. Packer said she was 
used as a go-between signer so 
that the seller wouldn't know the 
house was really being sold for 
$45,000 and the buyer wouldn't 
know it was actually sold for 
$40,000. 
In reward for her services, 
Packer testified she was told she 
would receive one-third of the 
profit made from the transaction. 
Packer said she was given a 
check for $1,160. $160 of which 
was for commission on previous 
transactions. Since she received 
only $1,000, she said she fig-
ured they must have made a 
$3,000 profit on the Bauer to 
Williams transaction. 
According to Packer's testi-
mony in Friday's preliminary 
hearing, she signed documents 
with no selling price listed. 
Packer claimed she wasn't aware 
she did anything wrong in fol-
lowing Kent Winward's instruc-
tions. 
Packer said she found out sev-
eral months later the property 
was sold for $45,000 and not 
$43,000. It was then. Packer 
said, she realized Cedar Land 
and Title Company issued her a 
check for $4,697.50. Packer tes-
tified that Kim Winward 
deposited the check into her own 
account. 
Packer said she contacted an 
attorney to see if forgery charges 
could be filed. 
Burns said he learned the 
property was sold for $58,000 at 
13 percent interest to Vicki 
Bassett with the Winwards serv-
ing as /purchasing agent. The 
Winwards allegedly told Williams 
they had a buyer who would pay 
$55,000 at 13 percent interest, 
and Williams agreed to the sale, 
not knowing Bassett would pay 
$58,000. 
Bassett testified that Kent 
Winward falsely told her he paid 
$3,000 as a down payment. 
Bassett. a hair and nail stylist, 
said Winward said she could 
work off the $3,000 she believed 
she owed by doing hair and nails 
for the Winwards*. Packer and 
another girl. 
All the transactions took place 
Aug. 9. 1993. and the Winwards 
also made six percent commis-
sion off each sale, Burns said. 
Only Kent and Kim Winward 
knew of all the transactions. 
Burns said. 
When the case goes to trial, 
Burns said he will attempt to 
prove theft by fiduciary (theft 
through violation of a trust) and 
forgery against the Winwards, 
Burns said he will attempt to 
prove the Winwards violated the 
trust of their clients. George 
Bauer and Vicki Bassett. and 
that the Winwards forged 
Packer's signature on a check 
made out to her and deposited 
it Into their oum account. 
